The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning Part I: A Method of Analysis by Becker, David M.
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 1969 Issue 3 
January 1969 
The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning Part I: A Method 
of Analysis 
David M. Becker 
Washington University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Land Use Law Commons, and the Property Law and Real Estate Commons 
Recommended Citation 
David M. Becker, The Police Power and Minimum Lot Size Zoning Part I: A Method of Analysis, 1969 
WASH. U. L. Q. 263 (1969). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open 
Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an authorized 
administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
LAW QUARTERLY
Volume 1969 Summer, 1969 Number 3
THE POLICE POWER AND MINIMUM LOT
SIZE ZONING
PART I: A METHOD OF ANALYSIS*
DAVID M. BECKER**
INTRODUCTION
The extension of urban communities far beyond core cities has been
one of the most dramatic developments of the past twenty years, one
which is continuing today, and at a constantly accelerating pace. The
dream of the good life in suburbia has finally reached the minds and
hearts of the great mass of Americans huddled in heavily populated
areas of those core cities. Their central desire is for new and better
housing for people with modest incomes. The accommodation of this
dream is not an easy matter. Its fulfillment requires provision of the
full spectrum of urban needs: shopping centers, parks, schools, utilities,
police and fire department facilities.
The impact has been greatest on the older, established suburban
communities which lie in the path of the new growth. Communities
consisting of large estates and inhabited by people of considerable
means have suddenly witnessed the arrival of new neighbors who want,
and are able to pay for, unpretentious, inexpensive homes. The
residents of these older suburbs have been largely unprepared for these
events unprepared to accept the psychological and economic
consequences of this development.
* Part I I will appear in Volume 1970.
Professor of La%, Washington University School of Law.
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A number of factors which are frequent concomitants of
urbanization has caused them to resist urban growth in their
communities. First, the value of already developed land often wavers
and sometimes decreases. Second, the community's fiscal burdens may
increase because high-density low-cost homes may not contribute as
much in new taxes as it costs to service them. This translates into
higher taxes for established residents without a proportionate increase
in the level of new services to them. Third, the general appearance of
the community as well as its living patterns may be affected. The
aesthetic value of the suburban "style" is lost, or at least changed,
when high and low density living areas are mixed. Fourth, the standard
suburbanite is white, some-perhaps many-of the new arrivals are
black. Obviously, the latter reason has been articulated most often in
recent years in private, although not too long ago it was not so
confined.
The resistance to new growth, however, has not always been total.
Particularly currently, many suburban communities have resisted
unplanned helter-skelter urban growth, in current jargon, "urban
sprawl," rather than any urban development at all. This reflects, of
course, an awareness of'changing social attitudes, coupled with a wish
to retain as much as possible of the suburban aesthetic and a desire to
control the timing and location of the new growth so as to minimize
the economic burden it imposes on the community. When timing and
location decisions are made by private developers primarily according
to how cheaply land-the raw product-can be obtained, the problems
have been compounded. Tracts of land best suited to non-residential
uses have been used for new high-density development simply because
they could be obtained more cheaply. Furthermore, residential
development has frequently assumed a "leap-frog" pattern. The result
is that the cost of the necessary new services is increased to an even
greater extent, and taxes have been driven even higher.
In any event, whether the resistance has been total, or whether it has
taken the form of efforts to control the timing and location of new
development, barriers, legal and extralegal, have been devised to
implement that resistance. The most common of these legal devices is
zoning.
Some ordinances have been enacted which zone exclusively for
agricultural or other non-developmental uses, while other ordinances
zone exclusively for commercial -or for industrial use. All of these are
presumably intended to prevent any residential development in the
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affected area. To prohibit high-density residential development in those
areas in which residential uses are allowed, ordinances may permit the
erection of only single-family residences and, in addition or
alternatively, impose minimum lot size requirements, minimum home
size requirements (commonly in terms of a required number of units
of floor space) and occasionally even unit cost requirements. Probably
the most versatile of these devices-certainly the most popular and
most often litigated is the minimum lot size requirement. Nearly
every municipality which has felt the impact of urban mushrooming
since World War II has enacted some kind of minimum lot size zoning
ordinance. The general range is from 10,000 square feet to five acres.
This study, which will be done in two parts, examines in detail the
use of that particular device in the context of the socio-economic-legal
problems generated by the spread of urban communities into suburbia.
Although other devices could have been selected, minimum lot size
zoning primarily because of its versatility raises more of the problems
which are endemic to the area than do any of the others. Hopefully, a
detailed study of this device, made with full consideration of not only
the legal factors involved but the social and economic factors as well,
will contribute to, and pave the way for, similar analyses of other
devices with similar purposes. To accomplish that broad goal the
balance of this article describes in detail the analytic structure which
will be applied in the subsequent article. In particular, a schemata of
various legal doctrines and concepts, "taking," "public use," "police
pov.er," and others will be established. The second article will consist
of an application of that analytic scheme to the minimum lot size
zoning device and a critique of what will have gone before, structured
in terms of social and economic realities, plus some observations about
possible future applications of similar analyses.
THE SCHEMATA
An important attribute of land ownership is the privilege to use it:
the legal freedom to devote land to those objectives which its owner
desires.' This privilege supplies the value of and reason for owning land.
I Ihe pri ate and public control of land use occupies a large part of property law. One need
onl\ examine the index to legal periodicals, the case reports, or the table of contents to property
casebooks and Treatises to sec that this is so. Nevertheless, Felix Cohen in developing a pragmatic
meaning of private propert\ concludes that the privilege of use is not essential to the ownership
of priale propertN Only the privilege of exclusion is critical to a system of private property.
Prisate propertN may or may not mnolve a right to use something oneself. It may or
Vol. 1969: 2631
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However, no civilized society can tolerate the absolute exercise of this
privilege despite its importance to the individual and to a system of
private property.2 Government exists for the benefit of those whom it
governs and in serving its public it is inevitable that the desires of some
will conflict with a governmental statement of public needs and
aspirations. Accordingly, courts have in principle acknowledged,
without challenge, the inherent 3 power of legislatures to regulate
without compensation on behalf of the public even though such
regulation may circumscribe the options individuals have respecting the
use of their land. Indeed, its universal acceptance has had a definitional
impact on the concept of private property. Seldom has a law student
escaped his first year property course without having observed
somewhere that property ownership is likened to a bundle of sticks, the
size and content of which will vary from time to time dependent upon
may not involve a right to sell, but whatever else it involves, it must at least involve a
right to exclude others from doing something. . . . Private property is a relationship
among human beings such that the so-called owner can exclude others from certain
activities or permit others to engage in those activities and in either ease secure the
assistance of the law in carrying out his decision.
Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property. 9 RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 371, 373 (1954). These assertions
are amplified at 369-74.
Cohen's conclusions about the relation of use and private property can be illustrated. Typically
the trust indenture for a large tract residential development will include a provision restricting
all land within the subdivision to residential use. Because these provisions are enforceable, the
trustees-and accordingly all the homeowners-have very significant rights with respect to each
lot within the subdivision. Fach lot is subject to a property interest owned by someone other than
the person who occupies or uses the lot. The indenture, by its restrictions on land use, has created
privately owned interests in property which do not afford the privilege of actual use.
These conclusions should not, however, in any way diminish the importance of use to a system
of private property. Though ownership of private property may exist without the privilege of use,
the system would have little meaning if the privilege of use was not prevalent regarding the subject
matter of these relationships. Certainly this is true when land is the subject matter of private
property. Property exists because of society, because of the relationships it wishes to establish.
These relationships spring from societal needs. These desires do not exist just because society
chooses to admire land in the same way it may choose to admire a painting. They exist because
of the use to which land can be put.
2. Though the privilege of use may be the primary reason for land value, if its exercise were
allowed absolutely by all, the privilege would indeed be self-defeating.
To permit anyone to do absolutely what he likes with his property in creating noise,
smells, or danger of fire, would be to make property in general valueless. To be really
effective, therefore, the right of property must be supported by restrictions or positive
duties on'the part of the owners, enforced by the state as much as the right to exclude
others which is the essence of property.
Cohen, Property and So vereignt y, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8, 21 (1927).
3. See I A. RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 2-1 to 2-2, 2-9 to 2-13 (3d ed. 1969). See also
E. FREUND. THE POLICE POWER 1-3 (1904).
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the state of the public law, and that the scope of rights, privileges,
powers and immunities that may exist with respect to any tract of land
may be diminished by legislative act without denial or redefinition of
private property.' This power to regulate-to control land use-is
founded on the police power.-
The police power has its origins in the realities of administering to
a civilized society.' Though limitations on its exercise are frequently
embodied in express constitutional provisions, courts have not, in
acknowledging either the existence or the scope of the power, had to
resort to specific constitutional authorization.7 It has been assumed
to be an essential incident to government, at least state government.8
4 ec Ris51,AI-\T Of PROPERT'I § 5(e) (1936). See also R. AIGLER. A. SMITH & S. TEFT,
CASES 0'N PROPI-RTN 506 (1960); J CRIBBET, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 319 (1962).
5. ,ee I A RAItHKOPt. ZONING AND PLANNING 2-1 to 2-27 (3d ed. 1969). See also I J.
M I NBMAL %I. Tiu LAW OF ZOING 16-17 (2d ed. 1955), which describes the police power as
"The ( ommunlty Power." Though the police power serves as the primary basis for public control
of land use, and is the only basis for zoning, courts hase sometimes given other reasons for
upholding land use regulation. For example, subdivision controls have been justified on the basis
of the state's power to condition the privilege of recording subdivision plats. Nevertheless, this
basis as well as others has been questioned. Indeed, it has been suggested that the police power
must serve as the basis for subdivision control just as it does for zoning. See Cunningham, Land-
Use ( onirol The .State and Local Programs. 50 IowA L. REv. 367,415-17 (1965).
It should be observed at this point, that what is meant by land use control is public control,
more specifically government control by legislation. There are, however, other methods for the
control of land use For example, the law of "nuisance" and "waste," both of which affect the
use ot land, are ancient products of the common law. Additionally, land use has been controlled
by private agreement reflected in conditions of defeasance, easements, and restrictive covenants.
These controls, though they may be even more effective than zoning, are not within the scope of
this article.
6. Governments find their reason for existence and their justification for continuance in
the services which they render to the health, safety, morals, conservation of resources and
general welfare of the group governed. It is, therefore, not surprising to find courts
repeatedly asserting that property rights are always held subject to the police power, that
is. the power of the government to do that for which it exists.
6 R Powit I. THir L . OF RE1L PROPERTN 72 (1969).
7 The Index Digest of State Constitutions, prepared by the Legislative Drafting Fund of
Columbia University, contains only two entries under the heading of Police Power. These entries
refer to the provisions of two states, Georgia and Louisiana, both of which simply declare that
the power shall never be abridged. Nevertheless, when discussing the validity of an exercise of
the police power. courts seldom have difficulty in affirming its existence or in giving it a general
definition, that it must be on behalf of the public health, safety, morals or general welfare.
See. e g. Board of Educ. v Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 207 N.E.2d 181, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129 (1965).
which viewed the police power as the only possible basis for upholding a statute which
extinguished possibilities of reverter and rights of entry unless recorded pursuant to the statute.
The authority which the court gave for its definition of the police power was judge-made and not
a part of a written constitution.
8 Nowhere in the Constitution of the United States is Congress given the power to enact any
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Because it operates inevitably to diminish the totality of options which
exist in the absence of its exercise, the very recognition of the police
power has required courts to avoid altogether or retreat from any
absolutist construction of express constitutional provisions which
purport to preserve the rights of individuals and land ownership.' And
law simply because it promotes the general welfare. Similarly, the expression of a broad police
power is absent from state constitutions. Nevertheless, there is a striking difference in theory
between the police-like powers which Congress and states may exercise. The power of Congress
is limited to that which is conferred by the Constitution; its power is not inherent. States may
exercise all powers, including a police power, not delegated to Congress or prohibited by the
federal Constitution. In theory, though Congress may legislate in the interest of the "public
health, safety, morals or general welfare," it must act pursuant to a specific grant of power. The
national power is not complete, it is not all encompassing. See. e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,
298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See also Steward Machine Co. v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) (dissents). For a more recent decision in which the Supreme Court
denies enforcement of a Congressional act because of the absence of specific constitutional power,
see Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Yet to say that Congress may not exercise a police power
is misleading; it ignores reality. Whether the power Congress exercises be regarded as inherent or
as delegated, and therefore limited, it has been successful in legislating extensively in the area of
health, safety, and general welfare, And on most of these occasions, if a state rather than Congress
had been the author of the legislation, it would have been characterized as an exercise of the police
power. Not since the 1930's has the Supreme Court had much difficulty relating Congressional
action to a specific delegation of power, especially the commerce power. See, e.g.. Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298 (1969) in which the Supreme Court found a privately owned recreational facility,
which admitted members only and was self styled as a "club," a place of public accommodation
whose operations affect commerce, and therefore subject to the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race in places of public accommodation, in spite of the
warning of Justice Black that:
While it is the duty of courts to enforce this important Act, we are not called on, nor
should we hold subject to that Act this country people's recreation center, lying in what
may be, so far as we know, a little "sleepy hollow" between Arkansas hills miles away
from any interstate highway. This would be stretching the Commerce Clause so as to give
the Federal Government complete control over every little remote country place of
recreation in every nook and cranny of every precinct and county in every one of the 50
States. This goes too far for me.
So long as the Supreme Court continues this policy, the distinction between the exercise of state
and federal police powers will remain relatively unimportant.
9. Federal and state constitutions alike prohibit legislation which impairs contractual
obligations, which deprives a person of property without due process of law or which takes
property for a public use without just compensation. Nevertheless, courts have upheld recording
acts which void otherwise valid but prior unrecorded conveyances and zoning ordinances which
prohibit valuable land uses. "Statutes may be enacted under the police power to prevent fraud
or oppression in business or commercial transactions . . ., and, if within the scope of the police
power, legislation is not invalid even though there be retrospective modification of private
contractual obligations. ... Board of Education v. Miles, 15 N.Y.2d 364, 369, 207 (N.E.2d
181, 184, 259 N.Y.S.2d 129, 133 (1965). "The constitutional declarations that
private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation or without due
process of law are always subordinated to the interest of the public welfare as expressed through
the exercise of the police power." Dube v. City of Chicago, 7 III. 2d 313, 324, 131 N.E.2d 9, 15
(1965).
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on occasion the conflict between the public interest and the rights of
the individual property owner has been severe enough to justify the
curtailment of all land use options, if not the abolition of all incidents
of ownership, as a proper exercise of the police power.'" Yet just as it
is inevitable to ordered society that individual prerogative must be
subject to public control, it is also true that private ownership of
property cannot persist without the retention of some private discretion
as well as some predictable basis for the assertion of limitations which
encroach upon these options."
Not nearly as essential to the theoretical recognition of private
property, but yet quite as important to a society whose economy is
greatly dependent upon continued capital ownership and investment, is
the notion that there are fundamental limitations on the kind and
extent of regulation which government may impose without
compensation. These limitations are as basic as the police power is
itself. They arise out of both a sense of fairness and necessity or, more
specifically: A fear that governmental excesses and abuses of power
may cause an individual to suffer a total or substantial loss in
economic value; continuous uncertainty about the legitimacy of the
legislative articulation of the public interest; and, finally, mounting
10 In ( onsolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57 Cal. 2d 515, 370 P.2d 342, 20 Cal.
Rptr 61X 11962). appeal dihmo,wd. 371 U.S 36 0162). The court conceded that plaintiff's land
which sas /oned for agricultural and residential use, thereby prohibiting plaintiff's rock and
gravel operations, had virtually no economic value other than for the use which had been
prohibited i at 530, 370 P.2d at 351, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647. Nevertheless, the court had no
difficultN in upholding the ordinance. Zoning inevitably curtails some uses, and quite often it
curtails a use to wshich land is particularly suited. Yet private choice must at times give way to
the public good. Id at 529-30, 370 P.2d at 351-52, 20 Cal. Rptr. at 647-48. However, it should
be noted that this va not simply a case in \&hich the land owner contends that the ordinance
deprics him ot the use to \%hich the land is most readily adapted. Indeed, the ordinance had
depri\ed hin of all economic use.
Recording acts have gone esen further. At common law a prior purchase of legal title was
superior to a subsequent purchase for value and without notice from the same grantor. Recording
acts hase, under certain circumstances, afforded a subsequent purchaser a superior title even
though the, have not usually made recording a requisite to valid title as between the prior
purchaser and the common grantor Vhenever a recording act operates to extinguish the title of
a prior purchaser in favor of a subsequent purchaser, all incidents of ownership have been vitiated
by the state in exercise of the police poxer. The supposed purpose for recording acts is the
prevention of fraud. However, the acceptance of 'pure race" statutes might suggest otherwise.
II Se. Cohen, \upra note 1, at 37 1-73 "i[lhe existence of private property presupposes not
onl\ soNereignty but some predictable course of sovereign action, so that the so-called property
owner .an count on state help in certain situations. . . . Private property, then presupposes a
realm of private freedom. Without freedQm to bar one man from a certain activity and to allow
another man to engage in that activt se \&ould have no property. If all activities were permitted
or prohihited by general lasis there sould be no private property."
Washington University Open Scholarship
270 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1969: 263
concern that unrestrained public control will seriously interfere with
incentives essential to a society and economy predicated on capital
investment. So it is that the police power which is central to the
administration of government is not a power which can be exercised
absolutely.12 Indeed, there is hardly a year that has gone by in which
each state court has not made some significant attempt to establish a
sensible basis for limiting the content and scope of the public regulation
of land use.
Courts have, in the main, justified their interference with the
legislative exercise of the police power on bases which are either both
definitional or constitutional.' 3 Whatever the basis, the results which
12. See dissenting opinion of Justice Bell, Bilbar Const. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Board of Adj.,
393 Pa. 62, 104, 141 A.2d 851, 872 (1958): "If police power or general welfare were un1littiled,
virtually every right of liberty, every right of property, and every right to a free press, and to
due process, as well as all other fundamental rights which are ordained in and guaranteed by the
Constitution would soon be superseded, abrogated and extinguished by 'general welfare'."
13. It has been said that the police power is incapable of definition. Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 32 (1954). Perhaps to define a police power, as such, is totally misleading. In the end, a
comprehensive definition describes nothing more than the legitimate exercise of governmental
power. Subject to specific constitutional limitations, including the obligation to award
compensation under certain circumstances, the legislature has the ultimate right to elaborate the
public interest. This interest changes; indeed it is always what the legislature says it is. Therefore,
to define the scope of governmental power-to state the purposes for which the police power may
be exercised-is a fruitless and self-defeating attempt to fix the public interest. Nevertheless,
courts have always subscribed to the notion that the police power must be exercised on behalf of
the "public health, safety, morals or general welfare." Furthermore, whenever they have
reservations about whether a regulation is in the public interest, they are apt to evaluate the
legislation in terms of their definition of the police power. And frequently when the regulation is
found unconstitutional, it is because a court has said that the legislation does not fall within the
scope of the police power. See, e.g., Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954). Yet
the closer one examines these decisions, the more he is apt to find express constitutional restrictions
lurking in the background; the police power may not be used to violate freedom of speech or
religion, to deny due process or equal protection, to discriminate on the basis of race, and other
such reasons.
Use restrictions upon real property must find their justification in some aspect of the
police power, reasonably exerted for the public welfare. The police function cannot be
expressed in terms of a definitive formula that will automatically resolve every case, for
its quality and scope are commensurate with the public exigencies arising from
overchanging social and economic conditions. But it is basic to zoning, as with every
exercise of the police power, that it be contained by the rule of reason; constitutional due
process and equal protection ordain that the exertion of the authority shall not go beyond
the public need; there cannot be unnecessary and excessive restrictions upon the use of
private property or the pursuit of useful activities; a substantial intrusion upon the right
infringes essential individual liberties immune to legislative interference. The restrictions
may be so unreasonable as to be confiscatory, and the regulation then transgresses the
organic law as arbitrary and oppressive. . . . The constitutional principles of due process
and equal protection demand that the exercise of the power be devoid of unreason and
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1
MINIMUM LOT SIZE ZONING
have been achieved have been neither logically consistent nor constant
in principle. The substance and scope of the police power is ever
changing; it has and undoubtedly will continue to grow. The process
of judicial supervision can, I would think, be accurately described as a
guarded recognition of the public need to expand rather than contract
the police power. What should be clear is that frequent judicial
attempts to demark definitional and constitutional truths respecting the
proper exercise of the power have failed. They have failed not because
of inadequacy of judicial definition or constitutional construction but
because courts have not recognized that these limitations arise out of
notions of fairness and necessity quite apart from any express
constitutional prohibitions. These notions are inevitably in constant
need of reevaluation. Just as the need to limit public regulation is basic,
there is also a continuing need to reconsider rationales used to support
resulting limitations on exercises of governmental power. Despite this,
some factors have and probably will endure. These are considerations
which ought to weigh heavily in any judicial review of a specific
exercise of the police power. For purposes of isolation, analysis and
criticism of these factors, it becomes necessary to develop a framework
for inquiry, even if the formulation of this framework requires some
deference to those definitional and constitutional limitations which
have proved unworkable as statements of absolute truths.
Frequently, when a court decides that a particular legislative
restraint on land use is unlawful, it characterizes the operation of the
regulation as a "taking" or as "arbitrary and unreasonable."
Whenever this occurs, judicial supervision manifests itself for
essentially the same reason-a basic concern with governmental
overreach. Perhaps because of this, the use of special language to
describe unlawful governmental regulation is understandable.
Nevertheless, one can and should always isolate more specifically the
problem which arouses concern and thereby at least eliminate some of
the confusion which arises out of the indiscriminate use of the word
"taking" and other terminology. When a court has determined that a
public land use control is unlawful it is generally for one or more of
arbitrariness., and the means selected for the fulfillment of the policy bear a real and
substantial relation to that end. It is fundamental in zoning policy that all property
in likc circumstances be treated alike. The use restraints must be general and uniform in
the, particular district. Undue discrimination in treatment and classification vitiates
the regulation.
Katobimar Realty Co. v Webster, 20 N.J. 114, 122-23, 118 A.2d 824, 828-29, (1955).
Vol. 1969: 2631
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the following related reasons: (1) the regulation has as its purpose an
objective for which the police power ought not to be exercised; (2) it
may operate unfairly and arbitrarily as to the particular landowner; or
(3) private options may be so diminished and the attributes of
ownership so substantially affected that the public goal can properly
be attained by compensation only-in simple terms too much has been
taken. 4 It should be obvious that these are reasons which are not
entirely distinct, and that it is difficult to evaluate a problem in terms
of one of these criteria without careful consideration of the others. The
problem of unfairness cannot be judged without consideration of the
impact of the act upon the bundle of sticks nor can there be any
sensible determination of whether there has been an unlawful
diminution of property rights without regard for the purpose for which
the police power has been exercised. 5 And by the same token there
surely must be measures which ostensibly fall within the acknowledged
ambit of the police power, but which, upon more careful examination,
achieve their objectives only by taking too much." Nevertheless,
14. For example, in County of Du Page v. Halkier, 1 111. 2d 491,496, 115 N.E.2d 635, 638 (1953),
the court concludes: "The means employed by the county zoning board do not appear to have
any real substantial relation to the public health, comfort, safety or welfare, and arc arbitrary.
unreasonable and void as applied to appellee's property." The county had sought to enjoin the
landowner from erecting an additional residence on his property in violation of an ordinance
which zoned his property for "Estates" and which allowed single-family homes on lots not less
than 165 feet of average width and 21/2 acres in area. Though the court found the ordinance
unreasonable because it bore no substantial relation to the goals for which the police power may
be exercised, it had nothing to say at all about what the ordinance did or was intended to
accomplish, nor did it discuss what is properly within the scope of the police power. Rather its
decision ultimately rested on the fact that enforcement of the ordinance would inflict substantial
economic loss on the landowner and would also operate unfairly because none of the surrounding
land uses met the standards of the "Estate" requirement. Though the court's conclusion was cast
in terms of reason one. in reality the decision was based on reasons two and three.
15. For example, we may hesitate to sanction legislation which denies a developer the right to
construct low cost housing in the interest of preserving the value of neighboring homes- yet we
may at the same time tolerate legislation which denies all developmental use because of the danger
of flood, fire or landslide.
16. For example, surely there is reason to question legislation which forbids all developmental
use or additional improvements in the interest of minimizing the costs of future acquisition for
parks, highways, schools or other public improvements. We may find it within the public interest
to regulate the timing and location of intensive residential development because of the
indiscriminate waste of land resources and excessive community costs which occur in the absence
of such control. Yet whenever this is accomplished by measures which deny substantial economic
use-and this is nearly always the case if new development is to be deflected to areas in which it
can be serviced conveniently-surely there is good reason to ask whether this ought not to be
achieved by awarding compensation.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1
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initially it is useful to focus one's inquiry and framework for analysis
on these specific reasons."1
It should be observed that each of those reasons reflects an adherence
to either accepted definitions of the content and scope of the police
power, definitions which can be found in neither federal or state
constitutions, or to express constitutional limitations which preserve
various kinds of individual rights and otherwise limit the scope of
governmental activities. To illustrate the latter point, a regulation may
be unlawful because it infringes upon freedom of speech or religion, or
because it discriminates on the basis of race, or otherwise denies equal
protection of the laws. This paper focuses in part on a specific
provision common to federal and state constitutions alike, principally
because it underscores many of the problems which have arisen and are
apt to arise in the use of large lot zoning.
The fifth amendment to the federal constitution provides "nor shall
private property be taken for a public use without just compensation."
This amendment has been made applicable to the states through the
fourteenth amendment.' In the main, however, the protection afforded
by the fifth and fourteenth amendments has been unnecessary because
the constitution of each of the states includes a provision which says
essentially the same thing as the fifth amendment,19 or even in some
instances goes further in protecting the rights of property owners:
"Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without
just compensation.-'20 This succinct statement introduces three complex
17 The remainder of the paper, specifically Sections I and II which follow, concentrates
primaril, on the first and third reasons is the goal appropriate: has there been a taking. The
second reason. having to do %%ith unfairness and arbitrariness, is considered in the schemata, but
only indirecily. As stated in the text, the specific reasons for finding unlawful an exercise of the
police posser ahich controls the use of land are not entirely distinct but are related. For example,
an ordinance Ahich forbids all developmental use, not because of special burdens or dangers
arising trom de'€lopment but because of benefits the community wishes to achieve from
nondevdcopment, may be characterized as unfair and perhaps arbitrary and may constitute a
taking A discussion of the problems presented by this kind of regulation, problems dealt with in
the schemata, necessarily involves the question of fairness. Accordingly, the schemata which
follo% do not avoid completely a consideration of the second reason. Nevertheless, independent
study ol this criterion, Ahich w'ould require special consideration of matters of equal protection
and of official machinery, such as the variance, developed to raise and rectify the problems of
unfairness. is beyond the scope of this paper
18 Se (hicago B & Q R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 235-41 (1897), in which the
Supreme Court concluded that the taking of private property without compensation for public
use b% a state is a denial of the due process guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.
19 "(". , . Y Co'),,T. art. 1, § 7. I-or a complete list of citations, see INDEX DIGEST OF
STAII 0)\SIITLTI(-\, 464 (2d ed. 1959)
20 St('. c , Mo. CoNsT. art. I, § 26. For a complete list of citations, see INDEX DIGEST OF
STAll 0 isilo ,o~s 464 (2d ed. 1959)
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concepts, each of which has been extensively litigated: (1) that
compensation must be made for property which is taken by the public;
(2) that property can be taken for a public use only; and (3) that, just
compensation must be made for property taken for a public use. In
simple terms: what is a taking; what is a public use; and what is just
compensation? These concepts taken together serve to limit the exercise
of two powers basic to the existence of government-the police power
and the power of eminent domain. The questions of public use and just
compensation nearly always arise when a governmental body exercises
its right of eminent domain.21 Can it condemn for the purpose intended
and how much does it have to pay? However, the question of whether
there has been a taking arises not within the context of condemnation
suit initiated by the government, but when a landowner is protesting
the application of a regulation in exercise of the police power.2 2 For
example, should a community be permitted to forbid all residential
development in a given area if to do so would deny all economic use
21. It would be surprising if the issue of just compensation was not the'subject matter of much
litigation. The appraisal of land values is hardly an exact science. The records of cases in which
damages are in issue are replete with testimony which favors both sides, The problem of assessing
land values is a difficult one; there is bound to be disagreement. Furthermore, the problem is made
all the more difficult whenever there is a partial appropriation of the landowner's property or
whenever the prevailing land in the vicinity of the condemned parcel is undergoing
change-something which may be affected by the condemnor's plan of land acquisition. The
question of whether the taking has been for a public use is also a much litigated issue. The
question arises and will continue to arise whenever the public purpose is accomplished only by
resale to private parties. For example, can a community, in need of a tax base and jobs, condemn
land for resale to industry on favorable terms? Any time land is appropriated by government from
one private party and turned over to another, it is inevitable that whether the purpose served is
public is a question which will be raised. In addition, there is, of course, the issue of whether public
use means ongoing public ownership.
22. These assertions must be qualified on two counts. First, the taking question may arise under
the guise of just compensation in an eminent domain proceeding instituted by the government.
This is especially true when the claim of the landowner is based upon a taking which exceeds
that which has actually been physically appropriated by the condemnor. Government may take a
portion of a landowner's property, and yet the landowner may claim that the land which has been
unappropriated has been taken just the same either because of the total loss occasioned by the
public acquisition or because of the use to which the appropriate land is put. Secondly, not all
condemnation proceedings are initiated by the government. Typically, a landowner will protest
the application of a regulation in exercise of the police power by opposing its enforcement on the
ground that it is unconstitutional. He may also proceed under the theory of inverse condemnation,
suing the government for just compensation and claiming that though the regulation exceeds the
police power, his land has been taken pursuant to a valid exercise of the power of eminent domain.
See Beuscher, Some Tentative Notes on the Integration of Police Power and Eminent Domain
by the Courts: So-Called Inverse or Reverse Condemnation. 1968 URBAN LAW ANNUAL I. It is
under these circumstances that the taking question may arise within the context of an eminent
domain proceeding.
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to those landowners within the district?3 Because this paper is
concerned with the use of large lot zoning, a regulatory device,
hereafter whenever the fifth amendment or its state counterparts is
under consideration it is the taking question which is being raised and
not the public use or just compensation issues. Furthermore, in an
effort to eliminate some of the confusion which has arisen from the
indiscriminate use of the word "taking" by courts, when the matter
of a "taking" or the taking question is under consideration in this
paper, what is being asked is not simply whether the regulation is
unlawful for any of the three reasons commonly assigned as a basis for
finding an ordinance illegal, but whether it is unconstitutional because
of the third reason only. Does the land use control present a question
of whether too much has been taken even if it satisfies our notions of
what are appropriate objectives of the police power, and even if it
presents no problems of fairness to the particular landowner? When
this is the issue, courts frequently focus on the express constitutional
provision which forbids a taking without just compensation.
Furthermore, if an ordinance violates this constitutional provision
because it is a taking, it cannot be sustained by awarding just
compensation 6inless it also satisfies the requirement of public use. That
which cannot be accomplished by regulation-because to do so would
take too much-cannot necessarily be accomplished by condemnation.
Though courts have, in recent times, tended to regard as congruent the
objectives for which the police power may be exercised and the reasons
for which land may be condemned, many courts have been unwilling
to fully equate these two concepts. 4 Not until the "public use" concept
23 St, (irubr v. Mayor and Township Committee of the Township of Raritan, 68 N.J. Super.
118, 172 A 2d 47 (1961) in which a court upheld an ordinance mhich rezoned land originally zoned
for residential use and for which there w'as a market. The rezoning was exclusively for light
industrial use for which there was evidence of no demand, presently or in the foreseeable future.
The change had been made to solve problems created by rapid urbanization, extraordinary
increases in population, inadequate school facilities, and financial crises precipitated by inordinate
demand for expanded municipal services. This case was reversed by the Superior Court, Appellate
Division, 73 N J Super. 120, 179 A 2d 145 (1962). The Supreme Court then affirmed the decision
of the Appellate Division, 39 N J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962) and in so doing noted that zoning for
exclusisc industrial use might be confiscatory and therefore invalid if the demand for light
industrial use ssas negligible or unlikely.
24 I-or Lases which tend to equate the public use requirement with a test of public benefit,
purpose or welfare, wee Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); Gohld Realty Co. v. City of
Hartford, 141 Conn. 135, 104 A.2d 365 (1954); State ex reL. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13,
110 N I 2d 778 (1953); Belvosky v. Redevelopment Authority, 357 Pa. 329, 54 A.2d 601 (1949).
For cases which give the public use requirement a narrow construction-tending toward actual
publi use. if not onership we Adams v. Housing Authority of Daytona, 60 So.2d 663 (Fla.
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on which the eminent domain power hinges is fully and under all
circumstances equated with the "public benefit" concept which
supports the police power, will a community have free choice to
accomplish its objectives by condemnation each time its effort to do
so under the police power is frustrated.
When discussing the problem of whether too much has been taken,
courts, and accordingly this piper, most often focus on the express
constitutional provision which forbids a taking without
compensation-the fifth amendment and its state counterparts.
However, when concern is with the first of the specific reasons courts
give for finding an ordinance unlawful-is its objective one for which
the police power may be exercised-one finds courts addressing
themselves instead to other expressed and unexpressed constitutional
limitations upon the exercise of the police power despite their proclivity
to characterize the ordinance as a "taking" if unlawful. Hardly a case
which has undertaken a consideration of the legality of a public land
use control, that diminishes without compensation the totality of
options that would otherwise accrue to the landowner, has failed to
point out that an exercise of the police power may be justified only if
it furthers the "public health, safety, morals and general welfare.""
1952); Housing Authority of City of Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953).
Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957); Foeller v. Housing Authority of
Portland, 198 Ore. 205, 256 P.2d 752 (1953); Edens v. City of Columbia, 228 S.E. 563, 91 S..2d
280 (1956); Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171, (1959). The court in tile
Georgia case expressly rejected the public benefit test. Though the Georgia constitution was
subsequently amended to allow for slum clearance and redevelopment, one may assume that con-
demnation for other purposes must still meet the test of public use.
25. See I A. RATHKOPF, ZONING AND PLANNING 2-1 to 2-25 (3rd ed. 1956) and the cases
quoted therein. This limitation upon the exercise of the police power-a judicial statement of the
basic objectives and limits to governmental power-also appears in those state statutes which
enable local communities to zone. The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, recommended by
the United States Department of Commerce in 1926, which serves as the model for many state
enabling acts, begins "For the purpose of promoting health, safety, morals or the general welfare
of the community, the legislative body of cities and incorporated villages is hereby empowered to
regulate . . .., and continues "Such regulations shall be made in accordance with a
comprehensive plan and designed to lessen congestion in the streets; to secure safety from fire,
panic, and other dangers; to promote health and the general welfare; . . ." The Act, as revised
in 1926, can be found in 3 A. RATHKOPE, ZONING AND PLANNING 100-1 to 100-6 (3rd ed. 1956).
[Vol. 1969: 263
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This is the commonly accepted statement of the purposes for which the
police power may be exercised. Neither this definition of the police
power, nor any other, appears in the written constitutions of either the
United States or of any of the states. Because it is an inherent attribute
of government, one can assume that there was no occasion to authorize
it specilically. and therefore none to define it. Nevertheless, concern
with the scope of that power is not wholly absent in written
constitutions, for each time a constituion imposes express limitations
on the exercise of governmental power it in reality identifies limitations
upon the police power. When courts focus on a consideration of
objectives appropriate to an exercise of governmental power they
invariably resort to the standard definition of the police power both to
justify and to circumscribe. And when courts find that the reasons for
a specific exercise of the police power are not comprehended by this
unexpressed definition they conclude that the regulation is
unconstitutional. What should become clear, then, is that this
definition is nothing more than an attempt by the courts to focus and
articulate society's concern about governmental exercise of power; a
concern which is only partly expressed in other provisions of the written
constitution. It is this concern about the kinds of goals that
government may accomplish by regulation which culminates in judicial
attempts tu give meaning to the "public health, safety, morals and
general welfare.'" And when that concern causes a halt to governmental
intrusions on the rights of landowners, the objections are inevitably cast
in terms of this definition, though often with an eye towards other
safeguards expressed in the constitution.
What follows first is a consideration of those factors and their inter-
relationships which courts have found relevant to a determination of
whether an exercise of the police power is appropriate.
I. THE MATTER OF GOALS
A4. Some Observations
Before attempting to enumerate the specific kinds of goals which
courts have ratified or found objectionable, several important
preliminary observations must be made. To begin with, these goals do
not exist in the abstract and any attempt to evaluate specific objectives
in the light of broad definitional limitations upon the police power is
necessarily misleading. The reason for this is simple enough: these are
evaluations which must be made within the context of a specific
Vol. 1961): 263]
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exercise of the police power embodied in a specific ordinance. To be
sure, one can discuss the appropriateness of making a community a
safe place in which to live, but a conclusion that in general a
community ought to be able to circumscribe the rights of landowners
in the interest of public safety without affording compensation is not
particularly instructive in resolving problems which arise in the context
of a particular exercise of the police power. The regulation itself, the
instrument by which the pubfic interest is promoted, cannot escape
becoming the focal point of any meaningful inquiry into what is
properly within the ambit of the police power. There are three related
reasons for this: (1) goals most often can only be identified by drawing
inferences from the instrument by which they are accomplished; (2) the
full impact and effectiveness of the method adopted to accomplish
certain objectives cannot help but be relevant in determining not only
what those objectives actually are, but also whether they are
appropriate; and (3) because an ordinance seldom accomplishes a single
objective or has a single effect, it is always necessary to take account
of all that an ordinance does as well as all it is intended to do. What
is always and ultimately at issue is the ordinance itself, not in the
abstract, but as it affects particular people in specific ways.
Ordinances do not ordinarily bear labels which clearly identify them
as health measures, safety measures, or measures intended to promote
the general welfare. Ordinances deal with. particular problems and
regulate in terms of specific directives or prohibitions: land within a
given zone may be used for residential purposes only for single
family dwellings; each home must be on a lot not less than one
acre in area. An ordinance may be intended to accomplish specific
goals, but those goals are not always clear from a reading of the
ordinance or its legislative history. For example, why the imposition
of minimum lot requirements for homes? Most often, then, the
objectives of an ordinance can be identified only by examining what its
authors purport to achieve and by taking a hard look at the actual or
probable effects of the ordinance. Implementation of the regulation
may produce a variety of results or effects. These results may be
nothing more than a reflection of the intended goals or of other
expected consequences without which the basic goals cannot be
accomplished. Nevertheless, the ordinance may also produce results
which in no way, or only incidentally, reflect the intended goals.
Furthermore, these incidental effects may be regarded by society as
neutral, as desirable, or as undesirable. For example, an ordinance
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1
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intended to prevent intensive urban development may incidentally
segregate residents on the basis of income or race.26 And whenever these
incidental results become prevalent or pronounced they ought to
obscure the intended or announced objectives or at least raise doubts
about whether these results are really "incidental"-doubts which
sometimes question the credibility of the promulgators of the
regulations. In many instances, it is only these results which afford us
any real insight into the objectives of the regulation against which the
appropriateness of the exercise of the police power must be tested. For
example, a community may create a district in which land is restricted
to agricultural uses, ostensibly for the purpose of preserving a vital
natural resource. This legislation will also incidentally prohibit urban
uses, It may be inappropriate to evalute the ordinance simply in terms
26 (onimunities frequently elect to prevent intensive urban development by imposing large
minimum lot or house size requirements. Large lot and house size requirements eventually
translate into expensive housing occupied by those able to afford it. Invariably this precludes the
Black horneowner. It should be noted. however, that zoning always evokes some kind of
segregation whether it be on the basis of land use, building type or size or otherwise. For a
discussion of this, see text accompanying notes 78 to 80 inlra. To some extent the very acceptance
of zoning principles dulls our sensitivit) to the issue of land use segregation and its various
justifications This is all the more reason to safeguard, by carefully scrutinizing legislative impact,
against that kind of segregation Ahich does not square with our constitution nor with the
principle, and freedoms central to our society. Yet does segregation of housing on the basis of
cost, and therefore income, offend these principles? Vhy regard it as an undesirable consequence
of some kinds of zoning'? Property values, xhich reflect the subjective judgment of buyers, do
suffer because of proximate heterogeneous development. People who plan to build or buy $100,000
homes dislike having a high-rise apartment for a neighbor or perhaps even a $20,000 home. People
will not generally pay S100,000 unless neighboring homes are within the same price range. Ideally
society ought to protect, if not effectuate, these preferences and, while making certain that within
each community land is allocated for divergent uses. assure that within each district development
is escntitally homogeneous. The fact remains, however, that absent substantial regional control
over the allocation of land uses, or absent a constitutional requirement that the land use plan of
each community must satisfy regional needs, land has been commonly allocated for expensive
homes on large lots not only without provision of an adequate mix of housing types within the
community, hut also without regard to the actual regional needs for expensive and inexpensive
housing Minimum lot and house size requirements have been adopted nearly always in the light
of an increasing and immediate need for moderately priced housing; a need which surpasses the
demand for expensise housing, and a need for which there is seldom adequate provision. See, e.g.,
Board of Supervisors v. Carper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); notes 110-111 infra. That
until eftefcti'e regionat controls Ahich serve these needs are imposed, experience has taught us that
communitie , if left to their own devices, will not allocate sufficient land to satisfy the demand
for inexpensiie housing. This problem can only become worse if communities are permitted to
continue their exclusion of low-cost residential deielopment. Only by finding these measures
unlawful Lan one expect to reach regional solutions. For a discussion of some of the problems
raised by exclusionary zoning, see Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal
PTret twtir . The indi'cnt. 21 STAN L REv 767 (1969).
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of the explicit goal. This is especially true when the prevailing market
for agricultural use is slight and the ordinance is not accompanied by
incentives to encourage agricultural uses."7 When these circumstances
obtain, goals associated with the prevention of urban development
should become both visible and primary: it is against these goals that
the police power must be measured. Furthermore, even when an
ordinance makes abundantly clear the purpose for which the police
power is being exercised, in assaying its goals there is substantial
reason for relying as heavily upon the results and the effects of the
regulation as on its stated purposes or legislative history. To take the
extreme case, suppose a legislative body avowedly sets out to regulate
the use of specific building materials in the interest of public safety.
Suppose, however, that the requirements imposed by the ordinance bear
no reasonable relation to the public safety and that they add
significantly to the costs of construction. Should not control of
minimum housing costs be recognized as the objective of the ordinance
and should not the propriety of the ordinance be adjudged on this
basis? What is now suggested is that an exercise of the police power
should be judged on the basis of all that it does and not simply on the
basis of its purported objectives. As the ultimate arbiter-and therefore
explicator-of legislative goals, courts must consider the full impact of
an ordinance in accomplishing what it purports to do. Indeed, when
measuring the appropriateness of regulatory objectives against
definitional limitations of the police power, consequences should be of
primary concern.
That a single regulation may produce a variety of effects, some or
all of which the legislative body may have intended to accomplish, is
27. Ordinances which zone for agricultural uses cannot of course compel the landowner to
devote his land to agricultural purposes. The landowner may always elect not to use his land, or
if other related uses are allowed, such as low density residential housing, to develop his land for
these other purposes. If the end sought is actual agricultural use, incentives as well as prohibitions
are usually required. On occasion states have been able to accomplish this without the use of
extensive restriction but rather by the use of incentives which encourage the landowner to commit
voluntarily his land to agricultural use. Frequently this is achieved by procuring the consent of
property owners to submit their land to agricultural regulation in return for stabilized assessed
valuations. Though these measures do not prevent the landowner who has not greenbelted his
property, by voluntarily restricting it to agricultural uses, from subdividing his land or selling it
to commercial users, they have achieved some success because they have been largely able to
immunize the greenbelted land from increased tax assessments based upon speculative
developmental values often precipitated by nearby residential or industrial development. Se
Wershow, Agricultural Zoning in Florida-Its Implications and Problems. 13 U. FLA. L. R[ v,
479 (1960); Note, Preservation of Open Spaces Through Scenic Easements and Grecnbelt Zoning,
12 STAN. L. REv. 638 (1960).
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a reality that must be reckoned with. This is obvious unless we are
willing to concede that the presence of a single goal, acknowledged to
be generally within the ambit of the police power, is all that is needed
to justify a specific exercise of the police power. The fact is that some
courts have been, and all courts ought to be, aroused by the presence
of those concomitant effects which conflict with our notions of what
regulation ought to be accomplishing. The specific land use control
under consideration in this article, minimum lot size zoning, aptly
illustrates the multi-goal, multi-effect phenomenon.
Minimum lot size requirements have been adopted for many reasons,
at least if we accept what courts say they are intended to do and what
planners say they actually accomplish. Lot size requirements have been
generally described as density controls.25 These requirements do affect
population density, but this seldom is an end in itself. Density control
is most often the method by which many related zoning objectives may
be accomplished. For example, the very first minimum lot size
ordinance which was approved was upheld as an exercise of the police
power in promoting public health and safety;"' and even today courts
2h [hough minimum lot size requirements do in fact induce low density development, in
theorn thev provide no assurance that this will be so. -hese requirements do not prohibit people
from huildin enormous homes w~hich occupy nearly all of the lot nor in occupying the homes
that art built 'ith large families. Only regulations which control the bulk of homes in relation
to lot si/c or Net minimum requirements in terms of living space per person guarantee that
development %% ill he low density
2 c, Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass 560. 563-64.42 N.E.2d 516.518 (1942).
The advantages enjoyed by those In ing in one-family dwellings located upon an acre lot
might be thought to exceed those possessed by persons living upon a lot of ten thousand
square feet More freedom from noise and traffic might result. The danger from fire from
outNide sources might be reduced \ better opportunity for rest and relaxation might be
af lorded Greater facilities for children to pla on the premises and not in the streets would
be ,isaifablk. . There may be a difference of opinion as to the real advantages that yvill
ac.rue from the larger lots and Ahether the\ are such as to lead one to the conclusion
that the adoption of the acre area Aill result in a real and genuine enhancement of the
publi. interests. It seems to us that a belief that such a result may be realized in this
tnstance is not unreasonable.. If the question is fairly debatable we cannot substitute
our judgment for that of the citizen, who %oted in favor of the amendment, and, whatever
our personal opinions may be as the wisdom of the amendment, we cannot pronounce the
measure insalid
Ihese, then. werc the reasons the court gase in upholding the lot size requirement* reasons
ha.ing to do with health and safety Ho%%eser. it appeared that these were not the reasons behind
the planning board's recommendation that the ordinance be adopted. The board warned the town
meeting that tax rates would go up if low cost housing was allowed, principally because such
housing requires greater and therefore more costly municipal services. The court agreed with the
landowsner that the restriction a minimum lot size requirement of one acre-could not be
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uphold lot size requirements on this same basis."' It is, of course, true that
this measure does operate "to lessen congestionin ihe streets; to secure
safety from fire, panic and other dangers; . .. to provide adequate
light and air; to prevent the overcrowding of land; to avoid the undue
concentration of population."'" More specifically, the capacity of a
community to cope with problems of topography, conditions of the
soil, sewage disposal, water supply, adequacy of existing and planned
recreational facilities, and police and fire protection, all bearing some
relation to the public health and safety, may be affected by population
density.32 Lots of people may mean lots of problems. Minimum lot size
requirements, especially the very largest, do diminish population
density and, because of this, many communities have looked to this
particular kind of control as a solution to these problems.
Most minimum lot size ordinances have as their ultimate objective
the temporary or permanent exclusion of intensive residential
justified on this basis. Though it may be a factor incidentally involved in the adoption of a zoning
ordinance, it may not serve as its principal justification.
A zoning by-law cannot be adopted for the purpose of setting up a barrier against the
influx of thrifty and respectable citizens who desire to live there and who are able and
willing to erect homes upon lots upon which fair and reasonable restrictions have been
imposed nor for the purpose of protecting the large estates that are already located in the
district. . . . We assume in favor of the petitioner that a zoning by-law cannot be used
primarily as a device, to maintain a low tax rate.
Id. at 565-66, 42 N.E.2d at 519.
In spite of the board's recommendation-that one-acre lot requirements were needed to avert
low-cost housing development and increased tax rates-and in spite of the court's rejection of this
reason as a proper objective of zoning, the court upheld the ordinance.
It cannot be assumed that the voters in following the recommendations of the board were
activated by the reasons mentioned by the board. . . .These reasons dealt with merely
one phase of a subject under discussion at the town meeting. We do not know what other
considerations were advanced for the passage of the amendment. The citizens of the town
were undoubtedly familiar with the locality and with all the material factors involved in
the necessity, character and degree of regulation that should be adopted in the public
interest. The action of the voters is not to be invalidated simply because someone presented
a reason that was unsound or insufficient in law to support the conclusion for which it
was urged.
Id. at 519.
30. See Demars v. Zoning Commission, 142 Conn. 580, 115 A.2d 653 (1955); Padover v.
Township of Farmington, 374 Mich. 622, 132 N.W.2d 687 (1965); Clary v. Borough of
Eatontown, 41 N.J. Super. 47, 124 A.2d 54 (1956).
31. See Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, § 3, supra note 25.
32. More people living in modest homes on small lots generate more traffic than would a less
densely populated area. Increased traffic frequently requires wider if not new streets. More people
increases the likelihood of crime and fire and this requires greater police and fire protection. High
density residential development in a community with on-site water supply and sewage disposal
systems requires installation of public facilities if the public health and safety is to be preserved.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1
Vol. 1969: 263] MINIMUM LOT SIZE ZONING
development-1- but for reasons difficult to justify as a public health or
safety measure. 1 Though it is exceedingly difficult in practice to discern
the erection of temporary barriers from permanent ones 3 5 the two will
be discussed separately simply because their underlying reasons may be
quite different.
The legislative abolition of intensive urban development-the
attempt to cast an immutable mold or image for community growth
reflecting its values and ideals by holding down population
density has been motivated by several distinct but definitely related
objectives. To begin with, a community may wish to create a place to
live in which the individual home owner's desire for space and privacy
is satisfied: a homesite surrounded by trees which affords space
sufficient to engage in a wide range of activities. It may also wish to
retain its physical or aesthetic character which is most often rural or
small town in appearance. Very large lot requirements may accomplish
this either by effectively closing the community's doors and sending
new development elsewhere or by affording the community a
bargaining position which allows it to accept newcomers on terms it
33 S' \i SocY OF PLXNNING OFFICIALS, NEW DIRECTIONS IN CONNECTICUT PLANNING
LIGISI NlION A STLD OF CONNECTICLT PLANNING, ZONING & RELATED STATUTES, 195-99
(1967). See at,,, Schmandt, Municipal Cbntrol of Urban Expansion, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 637,
651-656 (1961)
34. 'see text accompanying notes 53 to 58 and 79 to 86, infra. For a discussion of minimum
house si/e requirements and their relation to the public health and safety, see Haar, Zoning for
Minimum Standards The Ifane Township Case, 66 HARV. L. REv. 1051, 1060-62 (1953); Haar,
Wayne Tt wnshtp Zting for Whom5  In Brief Repli, 67 HARV. L. REv. 986, 987-90 (1954).
35 S('e \Ml SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS. supra note 33 at 196. In only one instance, did
the authors of this report encounter a situation in which it was clear that the exclusion of high
density housing was only temporary. In that case, one-acre lot requirements were imposed until
the community extended its sevier and water lines across a river to the area subject to the
regulation Extension of these utilities was to be completed within five years. Upon completion
there Aas a definite plan to rezone for higher density residential development. Such a plan is not
common Unless an ordinance expressly provides for relaxation of its minimum requirements
under specific circumstances, one can only assume that the barrier is permanent or
at least long range. If a community zones substantial areas, not as yet developed, for
uses for which there is no current or foreseeable market, one can only conjecture but never
he certain that the community will rezone at some later date if the pressure for other uses becomes
great enough For examples of ordinances which appear to create temporary barriers only-or
perhaps no barriers at all-by the use of expressly built-in procedures for change, such as
amendments, variances, and special exceptions, see Kotrich v. County of DuPage, 19 lll.2d 181,
166 N F 2d 601 (1960), County of Cook v. Glasstex Co., 16 1l1.2d 72, 156 N.E.2d 519 (1959);
Kaczorowskl v Elmhurst Chicago Stone Co., 10 lll.2d 582, 141 N.E.2d 14 (1957); County of
DuPage v Henderson, 402 I11. 179, 83 N E.2d 720 (1949); Josephs v. Town Bd. of Clarkstown,
24 Misc 2d 36W. 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960). See also Cutler, Legal and Illegal Methods
for (,mtroiltne Communitv Groith on the Urban Fringe, 1961 Wis. L. REv. 370, 396.
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chooses for itself.3 This latter practice is achieved by imposing lot
requirements large enough to make development uneconomical and by
offering to reduce these requirements in return for a developer's
agreement to build according to community specifications. This,
however, is not the only kind of homogeneity which a community may
wish to preserve or create. Low density zoning, for whatever purpose,
means more land, higher costs, and more expensive homes inhabited
by people who can afford to buy them. Whether intended or not-and
indeed if it is intended it is seldom articulated or acknowledged-large
minimum lot size requirements produce a community which has a
homogeneous economic character or which segregates and stratifies
new development on the basis of housing costs and, therefore, along
economic lines.37 Though wealth and skin color do not bear a one to
one relationship, there is a clear correlation. Ultimately, therefore, this
commonly translates into an effective exclusion of Negroes, or, at least,
into racial segregation within the community. 31
A community may also wish to prevent high density urban
development permanently for economic reasons, principally the savings
of taxes and the preservation or enhancement of existing property
values. By setting lot size requirements high enough, a community may
be able to avoid completely, or at least minimize, the capital outlay for
public facilities and services required for urban living. Low density
regulation means fewer people who require fewer schools, parks, and
police. Lot sizes sufficient to support private on-site sanitation and
water facilities obviate the need for public sanitation and water supply.
Minimal public facilities and services require less in taxes, which often
means higher property values.
The economic reasoning most frequently advanced in support of low
density zoning is often described as the "cost-revenue" argument."
36. AM. Soc'y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 198.
37. "The present Ordinance (which sets minimum lot size requirements) is obviously and
intentionally intended to exclude from this area the poor and medium-income people." Dissent
of Justice Bell, supra note 12, at 95. See note 26, supra.
38. Racial homogeneity may be accomplished not only by pricing the product beyond the range
of the Black, but also by setting obstacles which allow the community to select only the "safe
developer." See AM. Soc'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS. supra note 33, at 198.
39. Indeed, this argument served as the basis for the planning board's recommendation to the
Town of Needham, supra note 29. See Barnes & Raymond, The Fiscal /Approach to Land se
Planning. 20-21; J. Ass. INST. PLANNFRS 71 (1954-1955). For a discussion of the cost-revenue
approach to zoning, examples of its use in planning community development and citations to
studies which analyze its use, efficacy and validity, see Note, Snob Zoning-/I Look at the
Econontic and Social Inipact of Low Density Zoning, 15 SYRACUSE L. RIaV. 507, 514-18 (1964).
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That argument assumes that one can isolate the costs of public services
attributable to every land use. It also assumes that this same kind of
analysis can be made of the public revenue generated by each land use.
Assuming that the level of services a particular landowner receives is
not absolutely governed by the amount of taxes he pays, a comparison
of the costs and revenues attributable to any tract of land would
suggest that some kinds of development cost more to serve than is
received in real property taxes"' while others cost less. For example, it
is said that industrial and commercial uses contribute more than they
require while the opposite is true of most single family residential
development." The consequence of high density, single family
residential development is either the imposition of a greater tax burden
on the already established community or the lowering of the quality of
existing public services such as schools. In either case deficit
development causes a reduction in the value of pre-existent homes.
Accordingly, a community which wishes to preserve its tax rate, quality
of services, and property values commonly incorporates predetermined
cost-revenue priorities into its land use plan. And so long as the
community does not wish to remain exclusively a bedroom suburb,
commercial and light industrial uses will appear at the top of the scale,
while high density single family residential uses will appear at the
bottom, Large lot requirements are used, then, to effectuate these
priorities either by effectively preventing any new residential
development When there is no market for expensive homes or by only
allowing that kind of residential development which supposedly incurs
the fewest costs and returns the greatest revenue.
The reasons for creating temporary obstacles to high density
residential development are in the main related to the same economic
factors which underlie the erection of permanent barriers. Large lot
zoning has been used to check the haphazard development of
subdivisions which impose unusually high costs on the community and
to control carefully the timing and location of high density residential
development consistent with the community's capacity to provide
40 Thcsc cot-rcwsnue studies usualIN limit their consideration of revenue to taxes derived from
real proNrtN ',u Barnes &, Raymond. %upra note 39, at 73 and Snob Zoning, supra note 39, at
515- i . ercm hes one of the major flaws of this argument. See text accompanying notes 99 to
105. intra
4 1 s,,, Schmandt, upra note 33, at 65 1. Also Barnes & Raymond, supra note 39, and Snob
/lon ti', tq pra note 39. i-or a stud) Ahich seriously questions this conclusion, see MACE &
WJ( KI R I)) Si\61 I-%- MIL% Hoies Pv,, TOIUR WAY? (Urban Land Institute Research
Monograph No 15 1968).
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public facilities and services at a reasonable tax rate.12 Though the
general impact of the regulation is exclusion, its objective is one of
location and timing. This is accomplished by prohibiting particular
kinds of development at specific locations for a period of time.
Prevention is achieved in each instance by setting the size requirement
in excess of the demand for residential land use in the area.
The most obvious consequence of indiscriminate urbanization is
developmental sprawl and leapfrogging, a recurring phenomenon which
squanders away limited land resources, inflates the costs of supplying
public services and facilities to new development and furthers land
speculation.43 Development costs are a function of the price of raw land
42. For examples of situations in which zoning has been used for this purpose, see Josephs v.
Town Bd. of Clarkstown, 24 Misc. 2d 366, 198 N.Y.S.2d 695 (Sup. Ct. 1960); Board or
Supervisors v. Caper, 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959). Though much has been written about
this practice-see, e.g., Schmandt, supra note 33, and Fagin, Regulating the Timing of Urban
Development, 20 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 298 (1955)-there is scant evidence of its popular use
by local communities. In the main, this is because of the problem of distinguishing between
permanent and temporary barriers. See note 35, supra. Therefore, it is difficult to determine the
frequency in which communities engage in this practice.
The use of large lot requirements is not the only method for preventing excessive sprawl and
premature subdivision and for controlling the timing and location of new development.
This objective. . . has been sought in various ways, most of them designed to encourage
growth around existing settlements before opening additional land to intensive use. These
methods include: (1) public purchase of outlying land (or development rights thereto) to
be placed on the market as needs dictate; (2) limiting the number of building permits that
are issued each year; (3) demarcation of an urban service district and zoning of all land
outside this area for agricultural uses exclusively until such time as the city is prepared
to extend its service zone; f4) high zoning in the outlying sections of the municipality with
the understanding that the requirements will be lowered when a certain percentage of
development has been attained in the intervening area; (5) high zoning restrictions in
the outlying sectors of the community with the intention of reducing these when the city is
ready to extend sewer and water utilities.
Schmandt, supra note 33, at 652
43. Urban sprawl is a term widely used these days to describe the expansion of cities out
and out and out. Typically this outward growth has radiated along major transportation
routes, with the interstitial areas filling in after the land near highways and suburban
railways has been developed. But in the last decade there has blossomed a phenomenon,
not new but only slightly apparent until recently-the scattering of development hither and
yon throughout the countryside.
This scattered growth has an enormous, seemingly disastrous effect on the until-now
rural municipality which must provide service for the new residents, many of whom moved
from the city and expect urban services in a rural climate. These types of problems occur:
Each school district must provide an education for all children living within the district;
neither of two developments of, say, one hundred homes each located in the same school
district a mile apart, separated by open fields, is large enough to have its own elementary
school; thus, bus transportation must be provided to the children in one and sometimes
both developments. A development of two hundred homes with 10,000 square-foot lots has
on-lot sewage disposal units for each home, a borough a mile away has a public sewerage
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and the cost of land is usually a function of its proximity to the foci
of the urban area. The lure of cheaper land and larger profits drives
new development farther and farther away from the urban core. The
market is generally such that the concentration of subdivisions is
discouraged; competition for vacant land adjacent or proximate to new
development is avoided. Rather than capitulate to the demands of the
owner of neighboring vacant land which might very well be
exorbitant-an amount which one author has described as a counterfeit
element"-the builder must search for attractive tracts elsewhere while
leapfrogging over existing development. Though leapfrogging would
appear to have merit in that the builder avoids paying an inflated price
for land which would otherwise increase the ultimate cost of housing,
the saving is misleading, for in fact the long-range and social cost of
sprawl is extraordinary. Vacant land which has been bypassed is often
so irregular in shape and terrain or is of such a size that it is not
conducive to productive residential development. It may remain
undeveloped for some time. As a result the durability and flexibility of
a community's land use plan is often strained by repeated proposals
by landowners for changes to other kinds of urban uses because the
tracts can no longer economically be devoted to the permitted single
family residential use. Most important of all, however, it costs a
community much more to service development which is not
concentrated. 5 The objectives then of the temporary use of minimum
system which cannot be utilized because that system is used to capacity now and the cost
of expansion plus laying a trunk line to the development should be prohibitive in cost.
A farmer sells fifteen lots along the road to various individuals who build their own homes;
but increased traffic upon wnat were once rural roads requires increased maintenance, the
new residents request and obtain better police protection, and the new children crowd into
the old two-room school; the result is higher township and school taxes because the tax
return from the fifteen new houses is insufficient to pay for the increased costs of local
government.
This basic problem of coping with scattered metropolitan growth is commonplace in the
United States. . .. [Olne basic cure . . . is this: All development should be directed into
logical service areas and should be prohibited from scattering haphazardly.
Hallman, Growth Control: A Proposal for Handling Scattered Metropolitan Development, 33
LAND ECONoMics 80,81 (1957).
44. RAWSON, PROPERTY TAXATION AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT 27 (Urban Land Institute,
Research Monograph No. 4 1961).
45 A builder's reason for leap-frogging is usually to avoid paying an inflated price for
close-in land, and insofar as the cost of land affects the price of housing, this practice
would have merit. However, the cost of extending utilities to the outlying
development- which must include sewers, water lines, and streets large enough to serve the
intervening area when that develops-increases .the public costs enormously, an increase
that must be reflected in taxes. A most important public cost is for schools. Unless the
project is large enough to support its own school facilities, the isolated outlying subdivision
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lot size requirements are to eliminate sprawl by directing development
elsewhere and to postpone high density development in the area zoned
for low density until it can accommodate it. In short, it controls the
timing and location of high density development to minimize
community costs, maximize community revenue and avoid tax
increases .16
The diverse uses of a single land use control are thus evident. Though
a specific minimum lot size requirement may be used to accomplish
many of the foregoing goals, it cannot be utilized to achieve all of them
simultaneously.47 This complicates the problem of assaying the legiti-
creates a difficult and costly situation for the local school system. Even more important
from the viewpoint of the moderate-income family is the added locational cost that results
in a "leap-frog" subdivision.
AIM. SOC'Y OF PLANNING OFFICIALS, supra note 33, at 196.
46. Schmandt, supra note 33, at 651-53, gives two related reasons for controlling the timing
and location of new development:
These efforts, while differing from community to community, seek to accomplish
essentially two objectives in addition to the over-all goal of providing a pleasant and livable
environment: the prevention of excessive sprawl and premature land subdivision, and the
assurance of a balanced economic base that will permit the effective operation of local
government at a reasonable tax rate ...
All of these devices, by establishing a pattern of orderly progression outward from the
service area of the city, represent efforts to prevent scattered leapfrog subdividing. Such a
pattern minimizes sprawl, places less strain upon community facilities and services, and
permits a more economical and efficient extension of streets and utilities, thereby reducing
long-term municipal expenses.
The second and closely related objective-a balanced economic base --also contemplates
use of the above controls. Communities seeking this objective usually rest their plan of
development on three major premises: (I) necessity of maintaining a practical balance
between the residential and nonresidential elements of the community composition: (2)
responsibility to provide for various densities in residential districts so that no economic
class will be excluded because of uniformly high zoning restrictions; and (3) importance
of preventing disproportionate low-cost residential expansion beyond the reasonable
capacity of the supporting tax base.
47. All of these objectives are predicated on the exclusion at least for a time of intensive
residential development. If this is achieved, each of the enumerated objectives is in some sense
accomplished. Nevertheless, it should be observed that the fact of exclusion satisfies these
objectives differently and in varying degrees. If the legislative objection is the preservation of a
homogeneous community-the preservation of property values, community appearance and lile-
style, as well as the avoidance of urban utilities and services-its goals are satisfied by allowing
only that development which is consistent with that which is already there. If the legislative
objective has something to do with timing and location-the prevention of developmental sprawl,
conservation of resources, and the orderly provision of public facilities and services its goal- are
best achieved when all development is effectively prevented in the area zoned for low density.
Sporadic development, even if low density, makes it more difficult to relax low density
requirements when the time comes in which the community can conveniently service high density
development at this location. Consequently, some communities zone for low density to allow and
encourage within them only that development which can support on-site sewage disposal and
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macy of its objectives. It also places an even greater premium on the
importance of examining the effects of the legislation, against which the
propriety of the exercise of the police power must be judged.
B. What Kinds of Objectives Have Courts Found to be Within the
Scope of the Police Power?
At this point, it becomes necessary to summarize briefly the kinds
of criteria courts have established in evaluating the appropriateness of
the goals of specific legislation as well as the kinds of objectives courts
have found comprehended by the police power. The definitional
limitation that the police power may be exercised on behalf of the
public health, safety, morals or general welfare has served as the focal
point of most judicial inquiry. It is in terms of this definition that the
following summary will be made.
To begin with, the goal must be "public," that is, it must reasonably
advance the interests and welfare of society. For example, the police
power ought not be exercised for the exclusive personal benefit of a
mayor or his city council. Surely, an ordinance would be
unconstitutional which zones an area proximate to the mayor's home
for non-developmental use or imposes extraordinarily large minimum
lot size requirements in order to preserve the rural appearamce and
value of the mayor's home. That all would agree that the goal must
be "public" can hardly be debated, but it is difficult in many instances
to find a consensus about whether the objectives of specific legislation
are public. Once one admits that an ordinance may benefit only a
segment of society, the issue of whether the measure may be regarded
as public is inescapable. Perhaps this explains why many courts and
commentators have been troubled by legislation which has as its
principal purpose the regulation of aesthetics or the preservation or
enhancement of property values. The question they must find
perplexing is whose aesthetics, whose property values? Indeed this is the
context in which the public benefit question is apt to arise today.
Seldom are the lines drawn as clearly as they were in the example
involving the mayor's home.
Originally, all regulation of land use was intended primarily to serve
the public health and safety.4' Even today legislative bodies and courts
water suppls, whilc other communities may use this same device to produce a heterogeneous
commumt' serviced entirely by public facilities but at a reasonable tax rate.
48. I or a discussion of the history of land use regulation in the United States, with particular
emphasis on zoning, and its deelopment from the common law doctrine of private and public
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make some attempt at justifying land use controls on the basis of
public health or safety. 9 This legislation may promote the public health
and safety in two related ways: by protecting the public from dangers
which may arise because of the way in which a landowner uses his land;
and by the imposition of internal standards intended to protect
occupants of land against the dangers which may arise from their use
of their own land.5" For example, the public health and safety has been
protected by segregating development which may present special
hazards as to fire, noise, disease, smoke, fumes, rodents, insects, traffic
and other kinds of tangible or physical interference.5' It has also been
promoted by the use of building codes, sanitation codes, setback yard,
and area regulations intended to guarantee to the user of land
minimum safeguards against the same and other health and safety
hazards. 52 At one time or another bulk and density restrictions as well
as regulation which excludes non-residential development, have been
upheld because they protect either the health and safety of the
neighboring public or the users of land which is subject to the
restriction."
Most recent zoning ordinances still purport to protect the
neighboring public or the user of the land himself. Nevertheless, many
specific regulations cannot be justified solely in terms of public health
and safety.54 This is true either because the legislative purpose bears no
reasonable relation to the public health and safety, or because the
standard of health and safety promoted exceeds what reasonable men
would agree is essential, or exceeds what is regarded as satisfactory in
other parts of the community. To be sure it is possible to argue that
to treat all notions of health and safety in terms of accepted standards
is foolishness. There are many modes of life and some are more
healthful than others, at least in the sense that certain kinds of hazards
nuisance, see B. POOLEY. PLANNING AND ZONING IN TIlE UNITI D STATLS. 40-50 (1961). Sec also
I J. METZENBAUSi, LAW OF ZONING 1-68 (2d ed. 1955).
49. See note 30, supra. See also Lionshead Lake, Inc. v. Township of Wayne, 10 N.J. 165, 89
A.2d 693 (1952), appeal dismissed, 344 U.S. 919 (1953) and the discussion of this case by Haar,
supra note 34.
50. See Note, Zoning: Permissible Purposes, 50 COLUM. L. REv. 202, 211 (1950).
5 I. Id. at 212, for selected cases upholding ordinances on these bases.
52. Id. at 214-215.
53. See cases cited, id., at 202-211.
54. See Haar, supra note 34. See also Dissent of Justice Bell, supra note 12; Appeal of
Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d 118 (1954); B. POOLEY, PLANNING AND ZONING IN TIlL UNITED
STATES 82-100 (1961); Cunningham, Land Use Control-The State and Local Prograns, 50
IOWA L. REV. 367, 385-390 (1965).
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to life arc diminished or eliminated by particular styles of living. The
dangers presented by city smog and traffic do not generally prevail in
rural communities. Residential living in homes on spacious lots
provides advantages and obviates hazards associated with apartment
living. Nevertheless, society does not forbid urban and apartment
living. Any attempt to establish minimum standards of health and
safet% must necessarily reflect community values regarding the kind of
existence it wishes to achieve. To say that a community which zones
itself exclusively for single family residential uses has adopted a
regulation which is not predicated upon matters of health and safety
reall\ says nothing more than that the values embodied in the
standards adopted by the community are at variance with those values
embraced by other communities or the person making such comment;
that is, that there are those who would argue that the kind of healthful
existence achieved by single family residences is one to which society
ought not to commit itself by prohibiting all the other kinds of
development.
What should be clear is that this argument says and ignores too
much. Quite apart from problems of equal protection which are apt to
arise anytime a community permits more than one kind of residential
development which achieve varying degrees of health and safety
protection,- this argument fails to recognize that land resources do not
55. suret the most obious and frequent argument to be made by a property owner whose
land is prohi ited from uss allo\%ed elsewhere if not nearby-in the community, is that the
ordinane is arhatrarN and discriminator%. that there is no reasonable basis for classifying his land
differentk from that of his neighbor This is especially true of the cases which have litigated the
legalt\ olo Im density regulation promulgated bN communities which simultaneously allow higher
densil\ decelopment at other locations. S ec Bilbar Const. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Board of Adj.,
393 Pa 62. 141 A.2d 851 (1958). The use of multiple standards governing the construction
of single famly homes within the same community-- absent special conditions, such as
topograph,, Ahich raise peculiar problems of health and safety-is bound to produce attacks
based upon unfairness and denial of equal protection. At least one court, however, has gone
further and concluded that the presence of multiple standards may make it impossible to justify
the ordinance on the basis of health and safety. In Appeal of Medinger, 377 Pa. 217, 104 A.2d
118 (1954), the court refused to uphold an ordinance which required 1800 feet of minimum
habitable floor area in one district but allowed as little as 1000 feet in two other districts, and
directed the issuance of a building permit allowing the petitioners to erect a residence of 1125
square feet in the first district.
It does not follow that a minimum scale of habitable floor space in a home may not
have a reasonable, direct and proper relation to the health and morals, and possibly, to
the safety of the occupants of the house or of the community in general, because it is well
known that an overcrowding of persons or of members of a large family in a tiny house
or in a small room or rooms might undoubtedly have a direct effect on their health and
morals But if a 1000-minimum habitable square feet is reasonable and proper for every
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exist in an unlimited supply. Each time a community insists upon a
single rather than a multiple family dwelling, or each time it insists
upon a minimum lot size of one acre rather than 10,000 square feet, it
affects the rate at which the supply of land resources is exhausted by
limiting the number of people who can occupy a given area.
Furthermore, each time a community lowers its density it raises the
cost of housing within the community or at least within the region in
which the community is located. What must be recognized is that the
consumption of land resources and housing costs are greatly affected
by health and safety standards. And that these standards, these
statements of community values and aspirations, cannot or should not
be adopted without regard to how many need housing today, or within
the reasonably near future, and what can they afford to pay. In short,
there is no justification for legislating utopian standards of health and
safety when it is apparent that these are standards which cannot be
made available to most of society.56 The adoption of excessive
standards today may make it nearly impossible to achieve far less
desirable standards tomorrow. Health and safety standards must be
based upon a realistic appraisal of what is possible for all or at least
most of us, and each time these standards are not, we must look for
other explanations. Additionally, but just as important, is that
somehow there must be a point beyond which society ought not to tell
us how to live. Ideally, we should work only a certain number of hours
a week, obtain a certain number of hours of rest per night, subscribe
home in one district and does not adversely affect the health, morals or safety of the
occupants of such a house, 1125 square feet of habitable floor area in a nearby house
cannot adversely affect the health, morals or safety of that home or of that community.
Id. at 225, 104 A.2d at 122.
56. One commentator has concluded: "Rising land, labor, and materials costs are pricing home
ownership out of the view of most Americans." C. NOREN, ARGUMENTS FOR SMALLER LOT
ZONING 2 (1968). He attributes these increased costs in part to zoning trends which have occurred
over the past 20 years; trends which require "ever-higher minimum local standards for lot width,
lot area per dwelling, and increased construction specifications for roads and other subdivision
facilities." Id. at 1.
For whatever reasons, the private housing industry has not and is not satisfying the nation-
wide need for low cost housing.
This disparity between actual housing production and recognizing total needs reflects
primarily the fact that new housing construction costs plus related costs for improved land
can be absorbed at market financing rates only by the upper half of the income ranges of
the national population. Thus, the lower income range of the population, where housing
needs are the most acute, is generally outside the market which can be served by the private
housing industry in, so far as new dwellings are concerned.
Keith, An Assessment of National Housing Needs, 32 LAW & CONTENlP. PROD, 209, 212 (1967).
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to a halanced diet, and obtain medical check-ups periodically. Yet with
respect to these matters society has hesitated to legislate its ideals. It
has gone so far as to make much of this possible to those who cannot
afford it. but it has done little by xwaN of coercion.57 Surely, then if the
great hulk of our population finds urban life tolerable if not desirable,
which inevitably means a willingness to live upward and in close, there
is good reason to be suspicious of legislation which requires one to live
downNard and out for reasons of health and safety. The aversion is not
simply to a curtailment of land use options but to life style options as
well. And finally, is there any case for health and safety when a
community zones for low density yet sanctions intensive residential
development elsewhere within its borders- development which may
present greater hazards to life? How can a community justify, on health
and safet grounds, an ordinance which segregates apartment houses
from other kinds of residences, provides for a district to include single
family residences only, or imposes minimum lot size requirements as
great as five acres? As long as multi-family dwellings are sanctioned
at some location within the community, it would seem that their
segregation from single family residences must be primarily for
purposes other than health and safety unless it is assumed that peolle
who reside in multi-family dwellings lead a life which is substandard
as to health and safety. Surely the police power goes no further than
to authorize a single minimum standard.
In spite of all that has just been said, courts have continued to
appraise much of the new land use regulation in terms of health and
safety criteria, probably because of the virtually unbroken precedent of
judicial approbation in cases in which land use controls are found to
serve in some way the public health and safety. Nevertheless, these
ordinances ought properly to be considered in the light of whatever
meaning is to be given to the last and broadest of the definitional goals
of the police power, the "general welfare." The line between excessive
and appropriate standards of health and safety is a fine one. When land
use controls begin to pervade the entire fabric of taste and discretion,
when they begin to allocate and regulate vital resources without regard
to community, regional or societal needs, surely then the legislative
57 lhough society has restricted the number of hours that children may work, has prevented
emploer trrm insisting that their cmploees aork scien days a iieek, has required innoculation
of school . idren against highly communicable diseases, and has flouridated public water, it has
not compelled u, to make use of public hospitals or medical facilities, nor to take chest X-rays
though the, arc free, nor to make use of school lunch programs though they are subsidized.
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objective has departed the arena of health and safety and shaded into
the domain of general welfare. It is, then, within the crucible of the
general welfare that we must ultimately test our notions of what goals,
what values, what ideals should society be permitted to accomplish.
Specifically, what kinds of ordinances have at best an uneasy basis
in the public health and safety and must, therefore, find other grounds
for their support? Indeed what justification is there for ordinances
which: condition the issuance of a building permit upon a finding of
fact by a local building board that "the exterior architectural appeal
and functional plan of the proposed structure will, when erected, not
be so at variance with either the exterior architectural appeal and
functional plan of the structures already constructed or in the course
of construction in the immediate neighborhood of the character of the
applicable district established by [the] ordinance . . . as to cause a
substantial depreciation in the property values of said neighborhood
within said applicable district;""8 prohibit flat roofs, or prohibit
clotheslines in, front and side yards;59 exclude garden apartments, or
even two-family detached houses, by authorizing only single-family
housing in the district;" require housing to be built on a lot of one-
half acre or more;"' require that buildings constructed exceed a certain
cost; 2 impose minimum requirements as to the height or number of
stories of new buildings;6 3 prescribe minimum floor area requirements,
particularly with respect to one-story homes; or which provide that
"in every new instance the completed appearance of every new building
or structure must substantially equal that of the adjacent buildings or
structures in said subdivision in appearance, square foot area and
height?"65 What all of these ordinances have in common is that each
is intended to prevent that use of land which neighboring
58. See State ex rel. Saveland Park Holding Corp. v. Wieland, 269 Wis. 262, 265, 69 N.W.2d
217 (1955) (ordinance upheld).
59. See Hankins v. Borough of Rockleigh, 55 N.J. Super. 132, 150 A.2d 63 (App. Div. 1959)
(prohibiting flat roofs-invalid); People v. Stover, 12 N.Y.S.2d 462, 191 N.E.2d 272, appeal
dismissed, 375 U.S. 42 (1963) (prohibiting clotheslines in yards-upheld).
60. See Zoning: Permissible Purposes, supra note 50 at 209-11. See also Cunningham, supra
note 54 at 385.
61. See Simon v. Needham, 311 Mass. 560, 42 N.E.2d 516 (1942). See also Cunningham, supra
note 54 at 388-90 and cases cited therein-particularly those cited at 389, n. 110.
62. See Zoning: Permissible Purposes, supra note 50 at 204-07, and in particular, cases cited
at 205, n. 33.
63. See Zoning: Permissible Purposes. supra, note 50 at 205.
64. See Appeal of Medinger, supra note 54. See also Zoning: Permissible Purposes. supra note
50 at 205-06.
65. See Vest Palm Beach v. State ex rel. Duffey, 158 Fla. 863, 864, 30 So.2d 491,492 (1947).
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landowners-or perhaps the entire community-might find
burdensome or offensive. In a sense, the owners of all land, developed
and undeveloped, within the restricted area achieve substantially the
same benefits from the regulation. If a two-acre minimum lot
requirement is intended to hold down property taxes, this restriction
will inure to the benefit of the prospective home buyer just as it does
to his established neighbors. On occasion the prospective landowner
will achieve benefits specially intended for his protection, for example,
where the community does not as yet have public sewerage and water
facilities. Nevertheless, many of the minimum lot size requirements
which have been upheld exceed those recognized as essential to the use
of safe on-site water and sewerage facilities.66
The specific burdens which these ordinances are intended to check
are interferences not nearly as physical or clearly grounded in the
public health and safety as the hazards comprehended by early zoning.
Industry was kept out of the backyards of homes because of the noise,
traffic, congestion, soot and smoke which are so often associated with
industrial uses, while garden apartments are today kept out of the
backyards of single-family dwellings probably for other kinds of
reasons, principally because of the costs these apartments are thought
to impose on the surrounding community. These ordinances are
concerned with problems of aesthetics, property values, community
stability, adequate municipal facilities and services, a balanced tax
base, community fiscal policy, and racial and economic homogeneity,
nearly all of which have been the object at one time or another of
minimum lot size requirements. They attempt to resolve these problems
by regulation of new development reflective of community values and
aspirations. They achieve their objectives by inducing conformity in
66. In communities which lack a public sewer system-and often lack a public water system
as well --it Is clear that relatively large lots may be necessary in order to provide a greater
area for on-site disposal of sewage by use of septic tanks and to protect the ground water
supply from contamination. But such a justification will hardly support lot minimums
beyond one acre, even where soil conditions are not conducive to good drainage.
Cunningham, upra note 54 at 389. For selected cases upholding lot sizes in excess of one acre,
see cases cited id at 389, n. 110. See also Noren's discussion of minimum standards for any
methods of sewage disposal and their relation to lot size, supra note 56 at 10-19.
The number of cases upholding lot size requirements in excess of one acre does not provide
really any indication of the amount of land which has actually been zoned for this use in
comparison to the amount of land zoned for less than one acre. In Connecticut, for example,
60% of all undeveloped land which is zoned for minimum lot sizes is zoned for lot sizes between
40.000 and 80,000 square feet. roughly between one and two acres. See A.xi. Soc'Y OF PLANNING
OFFI IA2,, %upra note 33 at 186-87.
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land use, building design and appearance, house size, lot size, and cost.
Though there are differences which can be drawn among these
problems and solutions, what is common to all of them is the
preservation of property values within the district or within the
community. What is at stake is a community's life style, something
which is ultimately reflected in the value of its homes. That which it
regards as burdensome or offensive, whether it be the intrusion of blue
collar workers, Negroes, homes costing under $20,000 or designed by
Frank Lloyd Wright, becomes a real threat to its way of life,
crystallizing itself in a loss of property values which its residents have
labored so long to create. In a sense this is true even of legislation
which is intended to control new development consistent with a
community's existing public facilities and services or with its ability to
supply new facilities and increased services. When a community
regulates the location or tempo of new high density residential
development and gives as its reason for doing so that its existing
schools, fire department, police department or public sewerage and
water facilities are incapable of serving that new development,
especially at a particular location, it has elected to regulate not because
it is physically impossible to satisfy the needs of new development but
because that development cannot by itself support the new or increased
facilities and services it incurs at existing tax rates and the community
is unwilling to impose upon its residents a higher tax rate to accomplish
it. Accordingly, it defers that new development until, if ever, its tax
base is large enough to support new deficit development at a
satisfactory rate of taxation. Underscoring its decision, then, are the
matters of tax base and tax rates, both of which are wedded to property
values. Though we may react quite differently and be more receptive
to ordinances which set aside land for development which produces
more in tax revenue than it adds to public costs, or which regulate the
timing and location of deficit development consistent with a plan for
balanced community development and efficient and economic
expansion of public facilities and services than to ordinances which
preclude all development and all people who do not conform to a
community's values and goals, one cannot in the final analysis fail to
realize that the considerations which underlie both kinds of legislation
are remarkably similar.
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act provides that: "Such
regulations shall be made . . . with a view to conserving the value of
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1
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buildings ... ,"11 a provision which appears in most state enabling
acts."" However, many courts have refused to acknowledge the
preservation of property values as a justification for the exercise of the
police power, especially if it appears that the conservation of property
values is the only reason for its exercise.69 To be sure, it is possible to
relate most of these ordinances to the general welfare in a way which
makes them more palatable by underplaying the significance of
conserving property values: "[T]hey contribute to the general welfare
by promoting a reasonable balance, among economic groups in the
community, placing a reasonable limit on the total population which
the community must accommodate and enabling the community to
expand the necessary public services in an orderly and efficient
manner."-70 Nevertheless, one should expect that the judicial uncertainty
67 ,c, Standard State Zoning Enabling Act, § 3, supra note 25.
6K C unningham, ,upra note 54 at 369-72, observes that several states have limited their stated
objectne, to promoting the public health, safety, morals and general welfare. Though some states
have omited some of the purposes specified in the Standard Act, while others have added to them,
few hasc eliminated the goal which allows the conservation of property values. See Id. at 371-72
nn 14-15
69 'c cg, Appeal of Medinger, supra note 54; Elizabeth Lake Estates v. Township of
Waterlord, 317 Mich. 359, 26 N VW 2d 788 (1947); Frischkorm Constr. Co. v. Lambert, 315
Mich 556, 24 N.V.2d 209 (1946), Senefsky % Lawler, 307 Mich. 728, 12 N.W.2d 387 (1943).
See a/, dissent of Justice Bell, Nupra note 12 at 94-96, in which he warns of the dangers of a
broad concept of "'general welfare" and suggests that the "general welfare" must be considered
with and basc a substantial relation to the health, safety or morals of the community.
There are many cases which have discussed the legitimacy of an exercise of the police power
which has as its primary purposes the saving of community costs and the stabilization of tax rates.
Because increases in public costs are reflected in local tax rates and ultimately in decreased
property %alue,, the problems of community economics and the preservation of property values
are related if not identical. Therefore, cases which appraise the legislative objective of community
economics are also relevant to a consideration of the conservation of property values. For a
selection of cases which discuss the legitimacy of community economics as a basis for exercise of
the police poAer, we I A RTHKOPE, ZosisG ,',D PLANNING 10-1 to 10-13 (3rd ed. 1969). See
also National Land and Invest Co. v. Easttown Twp. Board of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215 AI2d 597
(1965). Board of Supervisors v. Carper. 200 Va. 653, 107 S.E.2d 390 (1959); Simon v. Needham,
311 Mass 560,42 N.E.2d 516 (1942).
70 C unningham, supra note 54 at 389; (/. National Land and Investment Co. v. Easttown
Twp Board of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 532. 215 A.2d 597, 612 (1965):
The Township's brief raises . the interesting issue of the township's responsibility to
those Aho do not yet live in the township but who are a part, or may become part, of the
population expansion of the suburbs Four-acre zoning represents Easttown's position that
it does not desire to accommodate those who are pressing for admittance to the township
unles such admittance will not create any additional burdens upon governmental functions
and sersices. The question posed is whether the township can stand in the way of the
natural forces which send our growing population into the hitherto undeveloped areas in
search of a comfortable place to live We have concluded not. A zoning ordinance whose
primary purpose is to pre%ent the entrance of newcomers in order to avoid future burdens,
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about what is meant by the general welfare" -uncertainty as to the
kinds of goals other than the public health and safety for which the
police power may be exercised-will remain unabated for some time to
come, if it is ever resolved. Extensive litigation of the meaning to be
attributed to the "general welfare" is inevitable. There is good reason
for this. Judicial uncertainty simply reflects popular uneasiness about
the kinds of things these exercises of the police power do or are
intended to do. There are several reasons why this is so. In most cases
neither the ordinance itself, nor even its legislative history, clearly
demonstrates, nor does it sometime suggest, that it is intended to strike
a balance among economic groups in the community or to enable the
community to preserve itself as a pleasant place in which to live by
achieving ordered rather than haphazard growth. Often, all that the
court has before it is an ordinance which excludes particular kinds of
development without any indication that the community is
accommodating that kind of development elsewhere, or has made plans
to accommodate it in the future. Providing adequate housing for the
poor is a most pressing problem today, and clearly the need for low
cost housing-specifically and to a large extent deficit high density
single-family dwellings-is probably greater than for any other kind of
residential development.72 Not everyone can afford to buy a $40,000
home. The great bulk of our expanding population is entitled to and
must find a decent place to live.73 The core city has proved inadequate.
Indeed, every time a community excludes low-cost development, it has
resolved its problems of taxes, schools, police protection and the like
by shifting them to some other community. And even if the exclusion
is temporary, so long as such development must be accommodated
somewhere, the community has bought time at the expense of others.
True enough, the community which regulates in this fashion has
promoted its economic well-being and, indeed, its own general welfare.
economic and otherwise, upon the administration of public services and facilities cannot
be held valid. Of course, we do not mean to imply that a governmental body may not
utilize its zoning power in order to insure that municipal services which the community
requires are provided in an orderly and rational manner.
71. "But 'the general welfare,' after five decades, remains intensely undefined as it relates to
zoning." Cunningham, supra, note 54, at 385.
72. See Keith, An Assessment of National Housing Needs, 32 LAW AND CONTEIP. PRton,. 209
(1967).
73. "[Slince 1949 it has been the official policy of the United States to achieve eventually a
'decent home and suitable living environment for every American family.' This policy was
established by the preamble of the Housing Act of 1949 and has remained the official national
goal through succeeding Congresses and presidential administrations." Id. at 209.
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Hoever, there should be concern anytime the public interest is viewed
so parochially. The police power is to be exercised on behalf of the
public health, safety, morals and general welfare. It is hard to accept
that the public which must be served lies only within the geographical
boundaries of the governmental body which has chosen to legislate.
Additionally, so long as this kind of legislation is apt to stratify
residents on the basis of income, and sometimes indirectly race, it must
necessarily tempt the line of what society regards as improper. 4 So
long as these kinds of undesirable consequences are unavoidable by-
products of exclusionary legislation, continued judicial uncertainty is to
be expected. Finally, when legislation is not clearly related to accepted
norms of health and safety, one can expect our aversion to
governmental intrusions governmental mandates as to how life should
be lived to make itself felt each time a community acts to promote
what it has decided is the general welfare. As these intrusions become
more and more pervasive, it is inevitable that doubts will be raised
about the appropriateness of the basis for the interference-the
community statement about what life should be like.
II. THE MATTER OF METHODOLOGY
Section 1, The Matter of Goals, concentrated on the problems of
identifying and evaluating legislative objectives. Though these are
problems susceptible to isolated analysis, they are not totally separable
from the matter of means or methodology: a study of the impact and
efficacy of an exercise of the police power. Section II examines two
problem areas: relating the efficacy of legislation in achieving its goals
to an evaluation of its legality; and relating the matter of legislative
impact to the issue of taking or governmental overreach. Though both
areas, especially the first, are difficult to distinguish from many of the
matters discussed in Section 1, the emphasis in Section II is sufficiently
different to warrant independent treatment. Indeed, it would be
superficial at best, deceptive at worst, to suggest that the problems of
means or method can be fully isolated from the problems of goals.
Both are concerned with the matter of legislative impact. Nevertheless,
in scrutinizing the methodology of ordinances which cause these effects,
every effort will be made to isolate factors which are both distinctive
and relevant.7 5
74 See Sager, Tight Little Islands: Exclusionary Zoning, Equal Protection, and the Indigent,
"I ST m, L REv 767 (1969).
75 For example, are there any special limitations on the use of a particular legislative device
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A. Methodology and Goals
Two important propositions about the appropriateness of legislative
goals have been set forth and discussed in Section I: that a specific
exercise of the police power may have as its purpose, and may
accomplish, many objectives; and that these goals are best discerned by
studying the impact and effect of specific legislation. What should be
clear is that a meaningful analysis of goals cannot be made without
regard to the ordinances by which these goals are sought. It is the
ordinance itself which provides our greatest insight into all the things
that it is intended, to accomplish. This sub-section, Methodology and
Goals, carries this analysis further. The focus is still on legislative
impact, yet this concentration on mechanics and effects comprehends
much more than a determination of legislative intent. Ordinances fre-
quently accomplish very little of what they are intended to do. Just as,
often they produce varied consequences, the appropriateness of which
we may reject, or at least question. By examining what an ordinance
actually does, we may perceive that it does not accomplish certain
objectives and that it accomplishes others, some of which may raise
important constitutional questions.71 Our evaluation of the issue of
constitutionality may depend largely upon the appropriateness
to achieve what, in the abstract, may be a perfectly acceptable goal? Surely there ought to beproblems with an ordinance intended to prevent horse-stealing which requires the on-sight killing
of every horse in the county.
76. Suppose a residential community zones most of its remaining undeveloped land forindustrial use only and it does this in order to preserve its current level of public services without
having to raise appreciably its tax rates. It hopes to accomplish this by allowing only that newdevelopment which produces the largest tax surplus. The community lies directly in the path of
urban growth which consists primarily of low and medium cost residential development. Thisdevelopment is unwanted by our hypothetical community because it requires additional schools
and greater police and fire protection without creating a tax base large enough to pay for these
new facilities and services. This, however, is not true of industrial development. Accordingly, this
community amends its zoning ordinance so as to shut off new residential development and to
allow for new industry. Unless there is already an existing market for industrial development in
the community or unless this zoning is accompanied by other incentives, such as preferential tax
treatment or public plant construction with favorable leases to new industry, setting aside landfor exclusive industrial use is not apt to attract that development sought by the community. It
will, however, succeed in excluding residential development. Apart from the question of thepropriety of the goal of municipal economics, see note 68 supra, the imposition of a zone for
exclusive industrial use under these circumstances will at least raise the "taking" question. It may
also violate both federal and state constitutions because it discriminates on the basis of race or
otherwise denies equal protection of the law, especially if low density residential development is
allowed elsewhere in the community. See Gruber v. Mayor and Township Comm. of the Township
of Raritan, 18 N.J. Super, 118, 172 A.2d 47 (1961), rev'd, 73 N.J. Super. 120, 179 A.2d 145,
aff'greversal, 39 N.J. 1, 186 A.2d 489 (1962).
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of those goals that are attempted, but it should also depend on
how eflective the ordinance is in promoting these objectives. For
example, should a court sanction an exercise of the police power
intended to accomplish what all would agree is a perfectly acceptable
goal, when all indications are that the ordinance is completely
ineffective in accomplishing that goal? To be sure it is possible to say
that this question is nothing more than an artful restatement of the
problems discussed in Section I where it is suggested that an ordinance
evokes certain consequences or effects and that these effects are its
goals regardless of what the ordinance purports to achieve. It is against
these consequences that we must test our notions of what ends the
police power may achieve. Accordingly, it can be argued that Section
I alreadN accounts for the factor of efficacy. That which is not
accomplished should not be regarded as a goal for which the police
power has been exercised. Only its real consequences-that which has
been accomplished are objectives which must be tested. However, this
argument is much to simplistic. It fails to recognize that the matter of
legislative effect is pluralistic and that legislative accomplishment
cannot readily be categorized as completely ineffective or effective.
Frequently, then, our study of legislative impact does not reveal a
predominant objective but a variety of consequences reaching out at
different ends. If any of these goals fall within the penumbra of the
"public health, safety, morals and general welfare," the question that
must airways be raised is how effective is the regulation in
accomplishing its goals, a question which is especially relevant when
an ordinance produces other consequences which we might regard as
sociallh undesirable or perhaps unlawful. The problem raised in this
sub-section is not simply with goal identification and evaluation, but
with appraising the efficacy and therefore the legitimacy of specific
legislation in promoting the public interest. It would seem that this
inquiry is warranted every time an exercise of the police power is tested.
It is especially appropriate in the case of zoning.
[here are undesirable consequences associated with every zoning
ordinance. The value of some land is inevitably diminished because the
array of options formerly available has been reduced. 77 Because zoning
77 lio. ccr, this doe\ not mean that the value of all land affected by the ordinance is
diminished Indeed the ordinance rjx enhance the value of land, especially that land whose use
options ha%e alreadN been hniited, by development or private agreement, consistent with the
restrictions imposed b the public regulation. [-or example, though a developer of a residential
subdiisol n in aunincorporated and unzoned portion of a county may by private agreement,
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classifications are usually drawn along geographical lines, there is
always the occasion for unequal treatment of neighbors. The
application of different regulations to similarly situated parcels very
often evokes a disparity in the value of these parcels. Additionally,
whether a zoning ordinance requires off-street parking or a building
code requires that certain heating, electrical wiring, or building
materials standards be met-all for reasons of health and safety-the
cost of the final product, a cost ultimately borne by the consumer in
the form of rent or purchase price, is necessarily increased. And finally
the very essence of all zoning has been to segregate."
Historically, the comprehensive plan was a reflection of rules of good
housekeeping applied to the community. Incompatible or discordant
land uses were kept separate, industrial uses in one place, commerical
in another, residential in a third. Furthermore, multiple-family
dwellings were isolated from single-family dwellings. The segregative
effect of these classifications which expressly separated various land
uses and kinds of housing was further amplified by the notion that
there was a hierarchy of uses: inferior uses such as industrial; superior
uses such as single family dwellings; and others in between. Superior
uses were permitted in any district which allowed an inferior use, but,
of course, not vice versa. In the end this meant that low cost housing
was nearly always found as a neighbor to an inferior use." In a certain
assure home-buyers that all lots within the subdivision will be devoted to residential use only, he
cannot guarantee that land without the subdivision will not be developed for commercial or
industrial use. Surely the market for homes in this subdivision will be enhanced, and thereby
its value increased, by a zoning ordinance which restricts neighboring properties to the same
use or at least prohibits uses which might adversely affect the value of the subdivision.
78. See Babcock, Classification and Segregation Among Zoning Distrtcts, 1954 U. ILL, L.F.
186, 201-04.
79. The early champions of zoning acted on the assumption that owners and occupiers of
urban land should be protected from the injurious effects of discordant land uses by
segregating different types of use in separate zones or districts. They also aimed to prevent
the worst effects of uncontrolled urban growth by establishing reasonable standards of
population density, light, air, and open space. The ideal city was viewed as a great
patchwork of contrasting zones rigidly segregating incompatible land uses, each zone
furnished with appropriate density, light, and air, and open-space regulations, all 'in
accordance with a comprehensive plan.'
Cunningham, supra note 54 at 382.
The ordinances of the 1920's, and indeed most zoning ordinances prior to the 1950's,
adopted the 'cumulative'-use zoning technique sustained in the Euclid case. These
ordinances excluded so-called 'lower' uses-e.g., commercial and industrial uses-from
'higher'-use zones-e.g., single-family, two-family, and general residence zones-but did
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sense, then, the proliferation of residential zones for the single-family
residence, which has occurred in recent times, can be regarded as a
logical extension of the good housekeeping rules instituted many years
ago that the kitchen be kept out of the living room, that the bedroom
be kept out of the kitchen or, in the language of the planner, that
dissimilar uses be kept separate. The segregative effect of zoning is
especially illustrated by low density regulation, which promotes by
area, if not by an entire community, economic and, sometimes,
indirectly racial segregation. Even if racial or economic homogeneity
is not the primary reason for large lot or house size requirements, it
certainly is not too subtle a consequence. Indeed, the very success of
zoning objectives predicated upon the cost-revenue thesis necessarily
depends on obtaining uniform housing costs. Thus, the effectiveness of
that zoning is a function of the homogeneity ordained and obtained by
the ordinance.
in the abstract, we might be expected to react to any regulation
which, even indirectly, produces consequences which offend our
sensibilities, if not our constitution. Nevertheless, up to a point these
undesirable by-products of zoning have been tolerated. Whether they
should be is less clear. It would seem that our inquiry must always take
account of the full impact of such legislation. At the very least, only
by examining what an ordinance actually does can we properly test it
against our notions of what a community ought to be achieving by
exercise of the police power. Furthermore, and beyond the matter of
identifying and evaluating legislative goals, we must also examine how
well such legislation accomplishes any of its intended objectives. We
must determine whether the measure of success obtained in achieving
appropriate goals justifies an ordinance in spite of those natural by-
products we may regard as undesirable. When minimum lot size zoning
not exclude the so-called 'higher' uses from the 'lower' use zones. Yet, it was obvious that
if commercial and industrial uses have an adverse effect on residential neighborhoods-as
all the early advocates of zoning asserted and the Supreme Court recognized in Euclid-the
same adverse effects upon residential land uses would result from the admixture of
residential uses in commercial and industrial zones. Thus, considerations of health and
safety would seem to have required adoption of an 'exclusive' zoning scheme, by which
residential uses, at least, would be excluded from 'lower'-use zones. But it was apparently
assumed that self-interest would preclude residential uses in commercial-and
industrial -use zones except where individuals lacked the intelligence or the economic
wherewithal to live in exclusively residential districts. Under the individualistic ethic of the
19 20's, such persons would simply get what they deserved if they 'chose' to live in
commercial or industrial zones.
Cunningham, supra note 54 at 382.
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is put to this analysis, many questions are raised about its legality. This
can be illustrated.
1. Promoting the Public Health and Safety
For good reason, we must first explore the efficacy of lot size
requirements in promoting the public health and safety. So long as a
regulation serves accepted minimum standards of health and safety,
courts have, and perhaps rightfully so, gone a long way in tolerating
the less desirable concomitant effects of zoning. For example,
hazardous terrain or soil conditions in a particular area have justified
legislation which regulates the design, materials and density or
residential development even when that legislation raises the cost of
housing and thereby prevents some who could otherwise have
purchased homes from living in the area. However, the tendency of
courts to overlook these undesirable consequences has been and perhaps
should be less when this same legislation must be justified on a basis
other than health and safety. The social priority for health and safety
may be high; the priorities against tax increases and wasteful
developmental sprawl may not be nearly as lofty.
There are relatively few instances in which a minimum lot size
requirement can or ought to be justified simply on the basis of health
land safety. This is true sometimes because it bears no reasonable
relation to matters of health and safety, sometimes because it serves
the public health and safety only indirectly, incidentally or fortuitously,
and sometimes because it does not serve health and safety norms which
are realistic in terms of what society ought to observe and can observe
for all. 0 For example, if the objective of a minimum lot size
requirement is minimum living space, space essential to the health of
residents, only an ordinance which sets requirements in terms of living
space per person guarantees the success of this goal. If its objective is
the avoidance of congestion and the assurance of adequate light, air
and open space, this can only be guaranteed by ordinances which
regulate house size in relation to lot size, that is, by the imposition of
maximum house size requirements for certain size lots. Though lot size
requirements may not reduce the number of people per living unit,8
80. See notes 54 to 58 supra, and accompanying text.
81. Though large lot requirements will directly limit population density, they have little if any
bearing upon the size of the families which occupy homes built on large lot developments. Indeed
there is some evidence that these families are larger than those which occupy modest homes and
that anticipated savings in educational costs accomplished by low density zoning are not as great
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they have indirectly affected the bulk of permitted structures and the
density of population. 2 Whenever development in lots zoned for
minimum requirements has afforded adequate living space, light, air
and open space, it is not because this legislation has guaranteed it, but
because people who buy large lots don't ordinarily build tiny homes on
the one hand or, on the other, homes which occupy substantially all
of a large lot. Nevertheless, in spite of the indirect success of these
requirements in achieving spatial goals it must be reiterated that the
good life the uncongested existence which is sought is one which is
beyond the reach of the major part of our population. Accordingly,
whenever the interest promoted is drawn so narrowly that it is difficult
to regard the benefit as public, the regulation ought not to fall within
the purview of the police power simply because it bears some relation
to health and safety.
Minimum lot requirements sometimes reflect special conditions
which exist in the area with respect to landscape or public facilities,
conditions which can in some way be related to the public health and
safety. Excessive bulldozer reformation of a rough terrain can create
as was once thought. To be sure, population density is reduced by allowing only one family per
acre rather than four, Ho%%ever, "contrary to suburban expectations, new 'estate district' housing
in today's limited housing market does not necessarily mean families will have fewer children.
The child ratio in such housing may be larger than the experience has been from other more
modest existing housing. The ratio of older children in grade groups which are more expensive
to maintain is also likely to be higher." See Noren, supra note 56 at 5. However, Rathkopf
concludes that the conflicting conclusions of studies which have been made in this area, make it
difficult to correlate lot size and school children. See I. A RAXT.KOPE, ZONING AND PLANNING
193 (3rd ed 1969).
82 One commentator has suggested that this is the reason why courts have had less difficulty
upholding minimum lot size requirements than minimum dwelling size requirements, planning
techniques %hich are remarkably similar in purpose.
The greater reluctance of the courts to sustain a minimum dwelling-size regulation has
its justification, though it is not indicated in the opinions, in the different functions served
by the regulations. Prescribing minimum standards for size of land parcel will indirectly
but effectively control bulk and the density of population, thus securing light, air, and open
space. In addition to preventing overcrowding of land and undue concentrations of people,
the munimum land requirement secures safety from fire, panic, contagions, and other
danger, And further, the maintenance of large and open areas free from noise and bustle
and the preservation of natural surroundings may be legitimate planning purposes in
themselves. Minimum requirements as to dwelling size, however, accomplish none of the
traditional purposes of the zoning power, Where the problem is size of the building
occupying the land, the goals of physical planning can be achieved only in terms of
makimums. Thus building bulk regulations are almost invariably formulated in such terms
(height, cubage. percentage of lot coverage, floor area ratio).
Haar. Zinine lor Minimum Standards The Waine Township Case, 66 HARV. L. Rav. 1051,
1060-61 (1953).
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significant conservation and water problems, something which is more
apt to occur when high density single family development is allowed.
Lots of less than a half-acre are considered incapable of supporting
both a septic tank and a water well.13 Therefore, the use of private on-
site sewage disposal systems, especially when a public water supply is
absent, requires at least half-acre lots, perhaps much larger ones if the
soil consists of clay, Adequate sewage disposal and water supply are
clearly related to public health and, in the absence of public facilities,
are directly affected by the size of residential lots. Surely, lot size
requirements in an area without a public sewerage system must exceed
those with one. Surely, the exercise of the police power in control of
land use ought to reflect the presence or absence of public facilities.
Nevertheless, there is great doubt whether the large lot requirements
which have been imposed in the absence of public facilities can be
justified simply on the basis of health and safety. There are two
principal reasons for this concern: 1) The lot size requirements which
have been popularized and upheld commonly exceed that which is
regarded as essential for health and safety;84 2) Public facilities and
services can always be provided, at least in time, and so the danger to
health and safety is short-term at best. Furthermore, because these
problems are often temporary and often soluble by other means which,
unlike lot size requirements, do not exclude low cost housing, 5 there
is good reason to question whether problems of sewage disposal, water
supply, and adequacy of public facilities ought to affect any long range
effort to shape the scope and substance of a community's new
development. Most communities constantly face the problem of
funding the cost of new or better facilities and services. Neither inertia
83. See note 66 supra. See also Am. Soc'y oF PLANNING OFFICIALS. supra note 33 at 193-94.
84. See note 66 supra.
85. One observer has seriously questioned the need for large lot requirements in order to
preserve health and safety in the absence of a public water supply or sewerage system. Noren
concludes: "Recent technical advances have shown the way to provide acceptable, permanent
sewage disposal within subdivisions platted in smaller lot areas." Supra note 56 at 4. He suggests
three solutions which allow for small lot development without need of public facilities, yet with
complete safety: community package plants (at 14-15); an integrated septic system (at 15-16); and
an integrated pond system (at 17-19). To illustrate, Noren points out that a 50-home subdivision,
with 6,000 square foot lots on 14.5 acres of land including 5.5 acres for recreation and disposal
pond use, could be developed safely. Furthermore such a plan affords considerable development
cost savings over a plan for development of the same number of homes on the same tract with
10,000 square foot lots (at 20-23). In short, neither the absence of public sewerage and water
facilities nor a community desire to avoid the costs of their installation justifies the requirement
of large lot developments and in turn the exclusion of comparatively inexpensive homes.
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nor a reluctance to assume these added obligations should serve as a
basis for avoiding them. Present capacity does not necessarily justify
decisions which ought to be predicated upon future capacity. This
much is clear-if the problem is one of timing rather than absolute
inability to service over the long run, the regulation cannot be
supported simply as an exercise of the police power on behalf of the
public health and safety.
If not the public health and safety, what then does a minimum lot
size requirement accomplish? Just how successful is it in achieving ends
we may regard to be within the ambit of the general welfare? How
strongly we may react to its sometime by-products of racial and
economic homogeneity may depend upon its success in accomplishing
other objectives. What follows is not an exhaustive survey of data
produced with respect to the effectiveness of minimum lot
requirements. It is intended only to suggest that low density regulation
may not always achieve those objectives which have purported to
justify its adoption.
2. Prewrving Community Character and Appearance
A small or rural community may wish to preserve its physical or
aesthetic character, including its appearance. A study of the relation
between large lot zoning and rural appearance published in 1958
suggested that the desired appearance will not necessarily follow the
enactment of low density regulation." Though rural appearance can be
identified by lot area or density groupings, the most significant rural
appearance factors are not a function of lot size. The most important
elements of visual character are: spacing, which is affected more by lot
frontage than area requirements; the presence or absence of urban-type
improvements; landscaping, whether natural or finished; and the
architectural design of buildings. Where growth is inevitable, though
large lot regulations may indirectly secure desired open space, they give
no assurance that the design of future homes and landscapes will
conform to the community ideal except when enormously large
requirements, subject to reduction in the course of bargaining with
developers, afford a basis for legislative blackmail-a practice which
ought to be questioned., 7 Furthermore, rural and small town character
86 Sc( \I\N1,MHL'LTTS DLPXRT\IMFT OF COMMERCE & THE URBAN AND REGIONAL STUDIES
SF-cTI\ 0 ri1 M\,SACHUSETIS I\STITITLT OF TECHNOLOGY, THE EFFECTS OF LARGE LOT SIZE
oN Risw m i I IOPMENT 10, (Urban Land Institute Technical Bulletin No. 32 1958).
87 %c, note 36 \upra and text accompanying notes 36 to 37 supra. The legality of this practice
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are not necessarily synonymous. Indeed, large lot requirements may
indirectly generate an open and underdeveloped appearance, something
associated with the rural character. However, '[S]mall towns have
traditionally exhibited a compactness, a differentiation from
surrounding undeveloped areas, and a quality favoring pedestrian
internal communication ..."I" Large lot requirements do not promote
these characteristics, if anything, they inhibit them. Finally, unless lot
sizes of five to ten acres are enacted over a large area to prevent
development totally, these minimum requirements do not even afford
a guarantee of permanent open space. If growth is imminent, the effect
is merely to disperse new development haphazardly farther and farther
away from the core of the metropolitan area. Indeed, one commentator
has concluded: "If what is needed is extensive and permanently
preserved open space to serve as breaks in the cityscape, to give identity
and individuality to peripheral communities, and also to set aside areas
of natural scenic beauty for the enjoyment and use of metropolitan
populations, large lot zoning will of itself not satisfy these objectives.""
3. Enhancing and Stabilizing a Coninnmity's Economic Position
The reasons which most frequently underlie both temporary and
permanent barriers to intensive residential development are economic
in nature, a kind of calculus of fiscal policy, community costs,
community revenues, tax rates, and property values. Central to these
reasons is the cost-revenue thesis. Whatever deficiencies can be
observed in the actual application of this thesis should bear directly on
our appraisal of the success of low density zoning in achieving its
apparent goals. First, translation of the cost-revenue thesis into public
ought to raise considerable doubt. At least three kinds of questions are apparent. First, the
community will be unable to achieve its superior bargaining position unless the lot size
requirement is excessive. Only by making compliance with the regulation, as written, impractical
and uneconomic will the community be able to exact desired concessions from the developer.
Requirements, large enough to obtain submission, must necessarily skirt the line of confiscation
and therefore a "taking." Secondly, should a community be able to procure from agreement that
which may not properly be procured by regulation? If a state court has cautioned against zoning
for aesthetics or preservation of property values, should a community be permitted to accomplish
these same goals by forceful persuasion? Finally, whatever the substance of the bargain, unless
the terms are always the same it is subject to the challenge of discrimination and unequal
treatment just the same as spot zoning. In short, because it is public regulation which initiates
and occasions the agreement, both the regulation and agreement should be regarded as community
action and must therefore satisfy all of our constitutional safeguards.
88. See ULI Bulletin, No. 32, supra note 86.
89. Id.
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policy tends to solve problems only by shifting them to others. Though
one community's fiscal problems may be alleviated by its use of lot size
requirements, the problems of the area, state and even the region may
be aggravated especially if the burden is shifted to communities which
are less able to absorb new high density development-often because
their fiscal problems are more serious. The scale of cost-revenue
priorities which serve as the basis for allocating the use of land is
founded on a policy which seldom reflects the current housing market
and rarely satisfies an overwhelming local or regional need to provide
relatively inexpensive housing for the bulk of the burgeoning
population. Any large scale acceptance of a policy, as an exclusive
basis for planning undeveloped suburbia, which forbids all deficit
development in order to preserve existing tax rates and property values,
only compounds the problem of venting the pressure for urban growth.
The public has an interest in finding places to live for people of all
economic groups. The bulk of the population can only afford modest
homes. A fiscal policy grounded upon cost-revenue criteria ignores all
other considerations and inevitably runs headlong into what ought to
be a primary goal of planning-locating the mainstream of urban
growth Y'
Second. it is far from clear whether minimum lot requirements do
effectively carry out cost-revenue policy: produce housing which pays
more in taxes and costs less to serve than intensive single family
residential development. The doubt raised here is not so much with the
policy itself as with the effectiveness of the method used to implement
the policy. To begin with, large lot requirements do not necessarily
generate residential development which is less expensive to service.
Some of the studies which have pointed to these problems have
concluded that the difference in the cost of servicing low and high
density development is not as great as one might have expected; that
there is no significant difference in total maintenance and operating
costs with respect to major municipal services; and that the per capita
capital outlay, though slightly less for lots of 40,000 square feet than
90 1 'en itf a community does not preclude all deficit development but rather adopts a zoning
plan Ahich reflects a mix of commercial, apartment, and high and low density single-family
residential development, there is no reason to believe that this constitutes anything more than a
token attempt to accommodate the demand for inexpensive housing so long as the number and
size of these zones are determined with an exclusive eye to preserving existing tax rates and
property values -hese policies, housing and community economics, though not necessarily
opposite goals, arc hardly synonymous and exclusive dedication to one or the other is apt to evoke
widely divergent allo ,ations of land use.
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for 10,000, was the same if not greater for lots in excess of 80,000
square feet." Though lots of larger sizes frequently require less in the
91. Lot Development Costs Need Not Rise With Lot Size. Comparisons of the capital
outlay necessary to develop residential lots of different sizes, considering all improvements
except actual buildings, indicate that lot area is not a very significant factor in determining
overall costs. Much more important, costwise, are the frontage requirements, the number
of improvements, and the character standard or level of those improvements. In other
words, an increase in frontage, or the number or standard of improvements to be installed
in the street right-of-way, or both, obviously involves a greater development outlay than
an increase in depth of lot.
While minimum lot area and frontage requirements are a function of zoning, regulations
governing the improvements to be installed in new developments or the standard or
capacity level of those improvements, come under subdivision control. The study suggests
that substantial economies can be achieved for the developer and home owner in large lot
districts if the requirements for certain improvements are waived, and the standard of
certain others adjusted with lot size in a manner appropriate to lower densities. For
instande, sanitary sewers, storm sewers, sidewalks, curbing and grass strips arc
improvements that might safely be eliminated in low density districts. Also, certain
adjustments in standards, such as narrower street pavements, fewer applications of asphalt,
or reduction in the number of catch basins, manholes, or drains, might also be made ...
In practice many such improvements are waived or modified at low densities and in
given instances for technical reasons (e.g., the topography. might make it physically
impossible to install a sewer). But no Massachusetts community is known to have
correlated its standards of improvement design and capacity under subdivision control with
the appropriate lot area and frontage districts under zoning although at least one planning
board has it under consideration. Such correlation of standards with density pattern might
produce substantial economies to communities, developers and home owners ...
Community Costs Do Not Necessarily Rise With Lot Size. In establishing certain
minimum lot size requirements many communities have apparently assumed that they
would thereby automatically curtail future municipal expenditures in new schools and other
public services. While such requirements obviously do limit ultimate population and thus
the ultimate quantity of schools, parks, playgrounds, streets, sewers, fire stations and the
like, there is no evidence that the community would achieve any per capita or per dwelling
economies thereby. Indeed it was found that capital outlay costs for the four municipal
services most affected by density showed a slight rise with lot size increase, particularly in
the largest sizes. However, this rise was not really a significant amount compared with
the considerable cost variations that actually exist between communities resulting from
level of service and complement of services provided, or location with respect to the urban
center.
. . . Thus it appears that density alone, when divorced from other variables, has
relatively little effect on overall municipal costs, assuming that the town-wide level of
services is generally unchanged. Only the largest sizes, i.e., above two acres, show an
appreciable additional cost.
It is obviously not possible to select any one lot size that is optimum in terms of
community costs. But there seems to be a middle range of lot sizes-greater than those
for which public sewerage is needed, but below the point where the cost curve commences,
it's a more noticeable rise-which represents the most lot area for the least cost to the
community. This range approximately corresponds to the range of most lot area for the
least outlay to the developer or home owner previously mentioned. But in the case of
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way of services, for example, lots beyond a certain size may alleviate
the need for public sewerage facilities, quite often it costs more to
provide the services which they do require. 2 The most significant doubt
raised by the selection of large lot requirements to implement cost-
revenue priorities lies in the assumption that large lot regulations
induce construction of expensive homes. If the economies achieved by
large lot development are not very great, it would seem that if tax rates
and property values are to be stabilized by large lot zoning, it must be
because the community tax revenues per dwelling increase as the
density is lowered. To be sure these requirements may prevent the
construction of low cost or even modestly priced housing. Yet it is
al%%as unclear just how successful large lot requirements will be in
inducing a tax base large enough to justify the exclusion of housing
which costs less. A survey of assessed valuations in relation to lot size
has revealed that the average valuation of homes does rise as the lot
size is increased. However, the survey also found that the range of
valuations within a given lot size was considerable and greater than the
variation in average valuations among different lot size brackets.
Inexpensive homes were found in substantial proportions on lot sizes
of 10,000 and 80,000 square feet. Furthermore, average valuations
taken of homes on the same size lots in different communities bore
marked differences. It was suggested that the kinds and costs of homes
constructed in a particular area depends just as much on community
prestige and popularity as upon lot size. Consequently, the assumption
that low density requirements will induce construction of expensive
homes is open to serious question. Even though this assumption is
demonstrable on a large scale sampling of average valuations, it is at
best tenuous when it underlies a plan for a single community or a
portion of it. And it should be emphasized that this is always the
context in which the land use decision is made: will the regulation
achieve desired results for this area at this time?94
municipal tosts, the variation due to density is so slight as to be relatively meaningless in
the oerall c ost picture.
U I I Bulletin, No 32. supra note 86, at 8-9. See also Note, Snob Zoning-A Look at the
Etwiw'mr and S o ia! lmpa t of Low Den sv Zoning. 15 SY RACUSE L. REv. 507,516 (1964).
92 hi Is otcn true simply because it may cost more to provide the remaining services, such
as poh~c and fire protection, highwsay maintenance and improvement, school transportation, to
developmcnt dispersed over a large area to dexelopment which is concentrated in a small area.
Set, note 43, % upra
93 See t' I I Bulletin No. 32. supra note 86. at 9.
94 See Margohs. On lhfniipal Land Pot fot/r Fiveal Gains. 9 NAT'L TAX J. 247, 252 (1956)
in which he explains the dangers of basing land policy on average relationships:
The allotation of government expenditures and government tax receipts is based on
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Third, the cost-revenue thesis assumes that with respect to every
parcel of land, one can isolate the costs which it incurs and the revenue
which it produces. What this analysis tends to do is to attribute certain
costs exclusively to particular kinds of land uses and also to restrict
its consideration of revenue to income received from real property
taxes.9 5 The single highest community cost precipitated by new
average relationships. The use of averages exposes the studies to error in two ways. lirst,
what may be true for the average use in the city may not be true for that type of use by a
new unit in a specific site. Gross analysis based upon average behavior may do a disservice
to the city which often must decide on a particular use in a given neighborhood. The
probable fallaciousness of averages is increased when we recognize that building
technology, styles of marketing and living, and patterns of plant layout have changed over
the years with the result that a new use may have implications for public finance quite
different from the older use.
Second, and equally important, is the point that the relevant comparison should not be
concerned with averages but with marginals. The policy question is not what are the
average situations but what are the consequences of a change in land use ...
95. Two studies, in examining the validity and success of fiscal zoning, have rejected this
method of allocating costs and revenues and, further, have concluded that high and medium
density development is not a tax liability and may pay for itself. See G. ESSER. ARE NLW
RESIDENTIAL AREAS A TAX LIABILITY? 1, 8 (1956); MACE & WICKER. supra note 4 1.
In the latter study, the authors applied a cost-revenue analysis to low medium priced (under
S20,000) hypothetical single-family house subdivisions in three states, California, New Jersey and
North Carolina. The Urban Land Institute, in reporting on the Mace and Wicker study, said:
For each of the three hypothetical subdivisions, local public costs and anticipated public
revenues were computed as realistically as possible and then compared. The three major
Study highlights from all three localities were:
(I) Virtually all initial public improvement costs are paid by the developer (and so
ultimately by the home buyer) in conformance with local subdivision requirements.
(2) The estimated non-educational public revenues cover, and in some cases
substantially exceed, the estimated continuing annual costs of non-educational services.
(3) Except in New Jersey (where property tax revenues meet about 85% of local public
education costs), the subdivisions pay their way over a period of time including grade and
high school education system costs.
Do Single Fanmil' Homes Pay Their Way?. URBAN LAND (Sept. 1968) at 5.
Based on the U.L.I. study, however, probably the most nearly correct answer would be,
"7t all depends.' It depends on such factors as: what type of residential development one
is talking about; on the nature of the state revenue procedures; on the local fiscal structure
where the development takes place; on local development requirements and financing
policies; and, finally, on which costs and to what degree they can be properly allocated to
residential use. ...
The findings in this Study indicate that it is not always true that moderately-priced
single-family homes contribute more to local costs than they contribute to local revenues.
In fact, it may be the exception more often than the rule.
While not conclusively established by this Study, one clear inference may be drawn,
namely those states with heavier reliance on state-administered income and sales taxes,
rather than on the local property tax, are in a better position to meet increasing public
service costs.
In the long run, the Study suggests that community leaders may find positive efforts
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1
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residential development is that for schools, an item which the cost-
revenue thesis apportions to the residential development served by such
schools. This practice has been challenged." Central to any criticism
of the cost-revenue thesis is that land uses are not independent.97 The
value of any use is a function of the use to which other land is put. If
this proposition is sound, so is its corollary that land use costs are
mutually dependent. In short, people costs should not be attributed
solely to people." Certainly the retail store, the medical clinic and the
light industrial factory do not directly precipitate the need for new
schools. They seem, therefore, to constitute a tax bonanza, contributing
far more in revenue than in costs of services they require. Yet these
land uses cannot exist, let alone thrive in a vacuum. They rely on the
proximity of customers, patients, and employees, skilled or unskilled.
They rely on the presence of families whose children must be educated.
They rely, then, on the presence of nearby residential development,
aimed at fiscal modification and reform (at both state and local levels) more productive
than restricti'e zoning in meeting the 'tax burdens' of new residential development where
it is needed
Id at 3, 8
96 In one community, 5% of the school cost was allocated to non-residential uses on the
ground that *'schools especially prepare a substantial number of students to enter local
employment." 'Ahy 5% ? Besides, if this approach is correct, should not all municipal
expenditures in residential areas be partly charged to non-residential uses, since probably,
without such services as arc provided, clerks and storekeepers and factory managers would
mose themselses and their establishments elsewhere?
Brnes & Raymond, The Fi.4al ,lpproadh to Land Use Planning, 20-21 J. ANi. INST. PLANNERS
71, 72 1954-1955). See also MACE & WICKER, Do SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES PAY THEIR WAY?
(Urban I-and Institute Research Nonograph No. 15, 1968).
] he conclusion as to the "liability status" of residential property is based upon the
assumption that is is appropriate to charge education costs (the predominant liability
resulting from residential development) back to property-primarily residential. This
assumption is open to question on at least two counts. First, public education as a
governmental function is not essential to the basic utilization of urban property. It i§ a
benefit to the community as a whole. Secondly, the property tax is not imposed on the
basis of benefits received, but rather on ability to pay. Thus, the cost-revenue estimate does
not fix financial responsibility. As a result, services directly benefiting property are the only
tunctions the cost of which can properly be measured in residential areas.
Snob Zoning, Nupra note 91 at 517.
97 'ee Margolis, On 'hunicipal Land Poic" for Fiscal Gains. 9 NAT'L TAX J. 247, 250-52
(1956).
98. %ee MACE & WICKER, Do SINGLE-FAMILY HOMES PAY THEIR WAY? (Urban Land Institute
Research Monograph No. 15, 1968). "A major feature of the study is that it departs significantly
from the more commonly used approach. It charges to each hypothetical subdivision only a
portion of people generated service costs. The rationale here is that services to people in any
specific locality are part of community-wide benefits and this relatively independent of specific
locations within the community." 27 URBx\ LAND 3, 8 (1968).
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perhaps even high density residential development. The land use with
the highest cost-revenue surplus is often vacant land." But the value of
vacant land, and accordingly its utility as a source of real property
taxes, is a variant of the existence and kind of nearby development and
the feasibility of converting vacant land into a compatible land use. The
same holds true for the much preferred light industrial use, presumably
a fiscal delight. Unless neighboring bedroom communities already
exist,'00 or are guaranteed by regional land use plans, 10' exclusive
devotion to the favored light industrial development to maximize a
cost-revenue surplus will not be effective. Industry will not locate
without a labor force. A labor force must reside somewhere, preferably
close at hand. 0 2 It is hardly realistic then to assign the costs of
99. See Margolis, supra note 97, at 25 1.
100. Even if this were so, it would be foolish to rely on other communities to continue allowing
deficit development which is needed to support fiscally productive development located in another
community.
Another level of irrationality is implicit in the policy of excluding some land uses and
encouraging others in order to realize the low property tax target. The success of the land
policy is dependent upon the assumption that the surrounding cities will not adopt the same
policy. If a city decides that low-rental, multifamily dwelling units are costly and bans
them, but that it desires the industry requiring workers who must live in these homes, the
city must rely on an adjoining city permitting these workers to live there. If all cities sought
to ban these workers, the industry would never locate in any of them. The success of the
program is therefore based on the illusion that other cities would not act competitively.
Margolis, supra note 97, at 250.
101. This is something which regional land use plans have not yet accomplished. In the main,
regional planning commissions have had little, if any, control over local allocation of land use.
See Becker, Municipal Boundaries and Zoning: Controlling Regional Land Development, 1966
WASH. U.L.Q. I, 19-23.
102. Even if industry and commerce make direct property tax payments greater than the
expenditures the city must undertake to service them, they require both customers and
workers in order to survive. The customers and workers may occupy low-valued properties
which make direct property tax payments less than the expenditures of the city necessary
to service them. The combination of the two, industry and its workers or stores and their
customers, may be financially feasible. A city may hope to separate the two and claim
the stores and industries without the workers. The neighboring cities may absorb the
workers and customers for awhile, but this solution is self-defeating once the neighboring
cities employ the same planning consultants for advice. ...
Once it is recognized that industrial or commercial uses require a labor force and a
supply of customers, the necessary analysis becomes more complex. Many dormitory cities
are attempting to attract clean light industry. The low public costs per acre and their
attractive appearance have combined to make them the preferred land use. The layout of
these plants involves an extensive use of space and a low investment per worker and per
acre. Often these firms use low skilled and white collar workers with relatively low wages.
To properly analyze the public cost and revenue assignable to this industrial site, we would
find it necessary to assign to it the costs and revenues to the city of the attached labor
force. It is possible that the light industry because of its low assessment per worker may
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1969/iss3/1
MINIMUM LOT SIZE ZONING
education to land which houses the labor force and not to assign some
portion of it to the land use which relies so heavily upon the presence
of the labor force. Finally, although the cost-revenue thesis ascribes the
sum total of added public costs to each new kind of development, it
virtually ignores the impact of land use decisions upon non-real
property tax revenues, a growing portion of local revenues.,' Industry
does not provide much of a base, if any at all, for a sales tax or a
personal income tax. These are taxes geared to people and people mean
residential development. If this is true, and the cost-revenue analysis
were revised to reflect a more inclusive definition of revenue, the scale
of land use priorities would probably be altered.' Cost-revenue
analysis should, but does not, sufficiently reflect either the mutual
dependence of land uses or the relation between land use and all
governmental revenues. Large lot requirements cannot be very effective
in .solving a community's fiscal problems if they are predicated upon
a theory which is faulty. Indeed there is good reason to question
whether conventional cost-revenue theory should, by large lot size
requirements or otherwise, be reflected in the ultimate land use
prerogatives of a community.
In view of doubts which have been raised about the efficacy of low
density zoning, what then must a court consider in passing upon the
legality of land use controls and in particular the use of minimum lot
size requirements? Should it not concern itself with what the regulation
is able to accomplish'? If a court is asked to judge the appropriateness
of certain legislative goals, should it not inquire whether these goals are
achieved by the legislation in issue? Only by examining what legislation
actually does can a court expect to focus carefully on those objectives
hw 'unprofitable' to the cit% and heax\ industry even if it had an unskilled labor force may
he more 'profitable' to the A.*.
Margolis. su/,ra note 97. at 251
103 Ihe inditference to rcNenues other than taxes introduces a major error in the analysis.
In the lung run this error will be compounded since property taxes are a shrinking per
cent of foal revcnues Industry which usually show s up favorably does not provide a sales
ta,. base. hile densely settled, low income families may prove a fiscal bonanza to a city
,Aiih a sales tax Similarli, subsentions from a central government are more frequently a
function of population rather than industrial or commercial use. Therefore, a more
inclusive definition of the fiscai base of a city may result in a shift in the advantages to
the city of the different uses
Margolis. %uipr note 97. at 250-5 1
104 Si' MV1I & \%I( KI-R. Nupra note 98 They conclude that whether a subdivision containing
homes under $20,000 is a tax liability %ith respect to public educational costs depends, in no small
part, on whethcr these cost,, are met olelN by local property tax revenues or by state-administered
ta\ revenues tach as income and sales tax rexenues) as %%ell.
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which are to be tested against our notions of what kinds of
governmental intrusions ought to be tolerated. Furthermore, even if the
test of legislative objective is positive, is in the interest of the public
health, safety, morals or general welfare, should there not be some
further assurance of legislative efficacy before the police power is
allowed to circumscribe free choice, especially when such challenge
bears questionable offspring? Is it not foolish to rest an exercise of the
police power on the public health and safety, when a careful analysis
reveals that in operation the legislation promotes objectives which bear
no relation to feasible standards of health and safety? Shouldn't a court
when asked to approve a measure intended to increase the local tax
base have some basis for knowing whether the legislation does exactly
that? Should not it also inquire what the other ramifications of the
legislation are? Should not a court, when asked to justify legislation
which often leaves in its wake economic and racial segregation have
before it what ends such legislation does in fact serve? Assessments of
the propriety and success of legislative goals must be grounded on
reality and this requires an examination of what legislation actually
does and not simply what the legislature says it is intended to do.
Police power goals do not exist in the abstract. They exist in and
because of legislation which does or does not in some degree carry out
these goals. It is indeed foolish to approve of certain objectives without
scrutinizing the probable success of legislation which implements these
objectives. To be sure, courts have been chary in their review of matters
of legislative discretion, particularly in the area of land use control
where all is not black and white and there may be many ways to skin
the same cat. Indeed, courts have on occasion gone so far as to rest
their decisions solely on the presumption of constitutionality inherent
in all legislative acts.115 The choice of a land use policy and the method
by which it is to be implemented is a matter which should be within
the province of the legislature. However, judicial circumspection should
not be confused with judicial abdication. The fact remains that
whenever the police power is exercised in the control of land use it is
denying rights-it is curtailing significant private options. The occasion
for legislative indiscretion is great. The judiciary ought not to surrender
its right of review. One should not regard a review of the efficacy of
legislation as a usurpation of the legislative function when the
legislation under scrutiny is fraught with ramifications which go to the
core of our freedoms.
105. See, e.g., Repp v. Shahadi, 132 N.J.L. 24, 38 A.2d 284 (1944).
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B. ,Ielthodologv" and Governmental Overreach
[inally, the method adopted to achieve a legislative goal must be
examined in a somewhat different context. Inevitably there will be some
cases in which we may wish to say that however appropriate the
legislative goal may be and however successful the legislation has been
in accomplishing it, it has been achieved by means which deny too
much. And because the ordinance reaches so far, we may at least be
inclined to say that if society wishes to achieve that end it must
compensate for so extensive an intrustion--"nor shall private property
be taken for a public use without just compensation." ' ' This question
and this reaction is latent in every instance in which the police power
is exercised with respect to land. For so long as the impact of
regulation is apt to diminish the full array of private options, so long
as it denies something, the taking problem is there and must be
reviewed whenever raised, however laudable the legislative purpose may
be."'7 This suggestion, that the impact of specific legislation is always
relevant to the question of taking, should never be regarded as an effort
to second guess legislative bodies, even though one may believe
otherwise about the review of legislative efficacy discussed in section A.
The constitution forbids a "taking", something which is potentially
present each time the police power is used. Though the absence or
presence of other legislative alternatives may affect a court's
determination of whether there was a taking, it is nevertheless
incumbent upon it to review carefully the problem of methodology and
overreach whenever raised by a landowner. Furthermore, these are
106 U S ( OxsT amend. V. See text accompanying notes 18-24 supra.
107 It is for this reason that the subject of methodology is examined in terms of the taking
problem a question of governmental oserreach. This is not, however, the only constitutional
issue A~hich may be raised by means selected to accomplish a legislative objective. Section IA
suggests that in evaluating an exercise of the police power, a court ought to consider the
effecttieness of the regulation in achieving its goals. Section lB suggests that in accomplishing
appropriate objectives, an ordinance may raise a variety of constitutional questions. Although it
maN succeed in sol ing problems of community health and safety, or in stabilizing property values
and tax rates, it may do this by denying equal protection or freedom of speech, or by
discriminating on the basis of race or religion. For example, suppose a community, faced with
the prospect of a demand for more schools and teachers, and therefore increased rates, because
it was situated in the direct path of residential growth, resolved its problem by allowing only
Catholics to occupy ne homes because it expected their educational needs would be served almost
entirel% b (atholic schools. Surely such an ordinance raises important constitutional issues.
Accordingly, though Section IB concentrates on a particular problem, because it is a potential
problem in e%ery exercise of the police power which controls the use of land, it is not the only
constitutional issue which may be examined by the application of this portion of the schemata
which focuses on the consequences of legislative methodology.
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problems which should arise with increasing frequency as the police
power is utilized to accomplish more and more. The more that we wish
to achieve, the broader our statement of land use policy, and the more
extensive the public elaboration of what serves the general welfare, then
the greater is the occasion for governmental intrusion and overreach.
Once again the use of minimum lot size zoning ordinances serves as
an apt illustration. One of the objectives of low density zoning is to
curb the wastefulness and costliness of urban sprawl by controlling the
timing of intensive single family residential development. More
specifically, sizeable minimum lot requirements have been imposed
throughout a community to delay high density development until it can
conveniently accommodate such development. These requirements have
also been used to control the location of intensive single family
residential development within a community. This has been
accomplished by prohibiting-setting large minimum lot sizes-such
development at some locations and allowing it at others, thereby
deflecting it to areas in which it can be serviced economically. What
should be clear is that even though an ordinance allows for some kind
of residential development its objective is in theory never really fully
attained unless development of all kind has been forestalled. Whether
the objective is timing or location, delay or deflection, any appreciable
development of the area covered by the low density requirement tends
to encourage or fix developmental patterns which may prove costly to
the community either in the immediate or distant future. At the very
least, it may make it more difficult for the community to convert the
area to other uses, for example high density residential development,
at a later date. Accordingly, that development which is allowed in the
area zoned for low density frequently is of a kind for which there may
be no current market. This land use policy, then, is best achieved by
the practical preclusion of developmental rights-by the denial of very
substantial options. In short, this legislative goal can only be
accomplished by skirting the line of governmental overreach.)" s This,
108. See Aronson v. Town of Sharon, 346 Mass. 598, 195 N.E.2d 341 (1964). in which the
court found a minimum requirement of 100,000 square feet constituted a "taking". See also
National Land and Invest. Co. v. Easttown Twp. Bd. of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965),
There the court concluded that there was no readily available market for four-acre lots and that
zoning requirement of four acres had substantially reduced the value of land affected by it. Ild.
at 524-25, 215 A.2d at 608. This was denied by the Township, In response to the Township's
contention that the requirement was lawfully imposed to maintain Easttown's character by
creating a greenbelt and preserving open space, the court observed: "By suggesting that the
creation of a greenbelt is a purpose behind this zoning, appellants betray their argument that there
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then, is a problem which should be anticipated each time the public
elects to deny substantially all right of developmental use, something
which may become apparent only after an examination has been made
of the market for allowable uses. It is a problem which can arise
whenever the police power is used to create a zone exclusively for low
density residential, agricultural, recreational, or industrial uses., 9
That this is a problem that land has been frequently set aside for
low density residential development without regard to the demand for
such housing, thereby tempting the line of governmental overreach-is
more than theoretical conjecture. Surveys of the lot size requirements
applicable to undeveloped land in two states have suggested that the
amount of land zoned for low density may exceed the preferences of
prospective buyers and accordingly the market for that kind of use.""
Attitudinal surveys of families have demonstrated a marked preference
for lot sizes of around a half-acre and certainly not more than an
acre."' The reason for this is simple enough. Lots larger than a half-
acre seldom achieve more in terms of privacy or space required for
family recreation while at the same time they impose added and
undesired maintenance costs. Nevertheless, lot size requirements in
excess of a half-acre or even an acre are not uncommon. Furthermore,
the decision to impose low density requirements appears nearly always
to have been made in the light of a growing market for less rather than
more expensive homes. In short, this means that the bulk of our
population has been restricted in choosing a place to live by the
devotion of large areas to residential uses without regard to their needs
and ability to pay. It also means that many landowners and speculators
must often find it difficult to market and develop the land which they
own. It is to be expected that their economic loss may be substantial.
is a read, market for four-acre plots. Only if there is no market for four-acre lots will the land
continue to he open and undeveloped and a greenbelt created. This, however, would amount to
confiscation of the property of Easttown landowners for which they must be compensated." Id. at
529, 215 A 2dat 610-11.
109 Two cases which consider ordinances which abolish virtually all private development by
the creation of an open-space, recreational, or conservation district are: Morris County Land
Improvement Co. v. Township of Parsippany-Troy Hills, 40 N.J. 539, 193 A.2d 232 (1963);
Grenhills Homeowners Corp. v. Village of Greenhills, 202 N.E.2d 192 (Ohio Ct. App.
1964), r'v'd, 215 N E,2d 403 (1966), cert denied, 385 U.S. 836 (1966).
110 ,'Sec ,, SoC'Y OF PL-NNING OFFICIALS 185-89, 194-95. Although the survey of buyer
preferences in Connecticut indicated a greater desire for large lots than did a similar survey
conducted in Michigan, there is still evidence that the amount of land subject to lot requirements
above one acre in Connecticut exceeds the buyer preference for such density.
IlI I Id at 194-95.
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It should also be expected that the imposition of lot size requirements
which do not reflect the market for those size lots will bring into sharp
focus the taking problem.
Though much has been written about the taking question,"' there is
little agreement about what constitutes a taking. To be sure, a physical
appropriation of land is a taking. However, problems arise and
disagreement occurs when the interference has been accomplished by
denial of use options and not by physical appropriation of land to
governmental use. Various rationales have been suggested and applied.
They have focused upon: the character of the use subjected to
regulation-that harmful and noxious uses could be curtailed without
compensation; ' 3 the extent to which the value of the land has been
diminished-how much has been taken and how much is left and that
an ordinance which denies all economic use is just as much a taking
as if the land had been confiscated;' whether the regulation compels
the landowner to confer a benefit upon the public without regard to
whether the use denied imposes a burden on his neighbors-it is one
thing to deny industrial use because of the dangers imposed upon
neighboring residents, it is quite another matter to compel a landowner
to use his land as a parking lot to satisfy a community's need for
parking facilities;' 15 and finally whether economic loss has been
occasioned as a result of governmental enhancement of its resource
position in its enterprise capacity-that compensation is not to be
awarded if all that government is doing is improving the public
condition by mediating conflicts between competing private economic
claims without producing benefits to any government enterprise."'
It should be expected that the taking question will remain difficult
to resolve despite efforts to give order and meaning to the decisions
which speak to this problem. One should wonder if it were otherwise.
There are several reasons why this should be so. First, the taking
problem cannot be divorced from the matter of legislative goals.
112. See, e.g., Dunham, A Legal and Economic Basis for City Planning, 58 CoIusi, L. RitV.
650 (1958); Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
113. For an explanation of the "noxious use" theory and discussion of its judicial history and
commentary, see Sax, supra note 112, at 39-40, 48-50.
114. For an explanation of the "diminution of value" theory and discussion of its judicial
history and commentary see Sax, supra note 112, at 4046, 50-60.
115. See Dunham, supra note 112, at 664-69, for an explanation of his "benefit-burden"
theory.
116. See Sax, supra note 112, at 61-76, for an explanation and application of his
"governmental enterprise" theory.
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Though land may have been especially suited to a particular use, courts
have not hesitated to deny that use where it has presented a real threat
to the public health and safety. Indeed, courts have sometimes upheld
regulations which deprive a landowner of all or substantially all
economic value." 7 These decisions would seem to suggest that the kind
and extent of the denials and intrusions which society will tolerate
without compensation are a function of those goals which are to be
achieved. The social priorities which we attach to various objectives
may well be decisive of the taking question, and so long as these
priorities are apt to undergo any kind of change, there will be
disagreement about whether there has been governmental overreach.
And surely change is inevitable. As the world about us becomes more
and more complex, these priorities must inevitably reflect the ever
increasing problems which confront our urban society. Second, though
the problem of judging the propriety and efficacy of goals may be dealt
with largely in generalities, at least in terms of legislative method, this
is not true of the taking question. If land is regarded as unique, it is
to be expected that a regulation intended to take effect over a broad
geographical area will affect each landowner differently. The
impact the kind and magnitude of legislative encroachment-of each
ordinance upon each landowner is in a sense unique. To the extent,
then, that the taking problem is particularized and accordingly the
occasion for litigation proliferated, the likelihood of judicial
inconsistency is greatly enhanced. Third and finally, the legislative and
judicial history of the United States has been marked by an ever
increasing tolerance for governmental pervasiveness. Our lives are
today affected more by governmental activities and controls than they
were fifty years ago, thirty years ago or even five years ago.
Government does more for us-and, perhaps, to us-today than
yesterday. Medicare is new, but so are the taxes which pay for it. Some
time ago we were forbidden from employing children in certain jobs or
for more than a specified number of hours per week. More recently we
117 S ' cg, Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926) (prohibition of industrial
development loss of 75% of value); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915) (prohibition
of brickyard --loss of over 90% of value), Consolidated Rock Products Co. v. Los Angeles, 57
Cal.2d 515, 370 Po2d 342, 20 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1962), appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 36 (1962);
(prohibition of rock and gravel operation loss of all value). All of these ordinances had some
relation to preserving the public health and safety. Qf. National Land and Invest. Co. v. Easttown
Twp. Bd of Adj., 419 Pa. 504, 215 A.2d 597 (1965) (prohibition of all development other than
single-family residential on lots of four acres loss of 33% of value).
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have been told that we must sell our homes and must open our schools
and places of public accommodation without regard to race. We have
become immunized in time to the ever increasing presence of
government in our daily lives. Its acceptance has not come easily. The
dialogue has been a rich and sometimes bitter one. It is to be expected
that this dialogue will continue. The question of governmental
domination and pervasiveness is far from resolved: perhaps it will never
be settled.
CONCLUSION
The purpose of Part I has been to develop a schemata of the police
power and related concepts; to develop an analytic structure against
which exercises of governmental power may be tested. Before
proceeding to the application of this schemata, which is the purpose of
Part II, some basic observations and conclusions should be drawn.
First, the crucible in which this analysis has been developed, illustrated
and will be applied, is the minimum lot size requirement. However,this
particular land use control has been and will be used only as a model
for theorizing and testing. All that is said in Part I about a method
for judging the propriety of an ordinance which imposes minimum lot
size requirements is fully applicable to other exercises of the police
power which control the use of land, especially those which set out to
achieve any or all of the objectives which lot size requirements are
expected to accomplish. On occasion, regulations have zoned
exclusively for industrial or agricultural use; have imposed minimum
floor area requirements; or have imposed minimum cost requirements.
Each of these regulations may have as its primary objective the
exclusion of low cost single family homes, something which is
especially evident when there is no significant market for the uses which
are allowed. Surely all that has been said about evaluating the legality
of lot size requirements is relevant to an examination of these other
controls. Secondly, the schemata is not a litmus which can be tested
against an ordinance or a decision and tell us when the legislation is
unlawful or when the court is wrong. It is an approach, a guide to
understanding the problems raised in the control of land use. Because
the matter of governmental function and power does not lend itself to
absolute truths, a schemata devoted to its analysis must avoid a
commitment to inflexibility. The tensions of society caused by endless
changes in the world about us dictate nothing less. The solutions to new
problems may well require a greater and continuing tolerance for
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governmental power and intrusion upon free choice. Finally, an
analysis of a specific exercise of the police power can be and should
be accomplished in fairly systematic fashion. Even though the police
power concept is never static and is always undergoing some kind of
change, even though its exercise is always limited by a public sense of
fairness and necessity, the use of basic standards for judicial inquiry is
both feasible and appropriate. What consequences, intended or
otherwise, is a regulation apt to produce? What is it that the regulation
accomplishes? How well do these results square with our notions of
what government ought to be doing? How effective is it in achieving
its objectives? How substantial is its intrusion into private choice? Only
by raising these questions and attempting their answer, can courts
begin to focus on the problem which is central: has the legislation
exceeded our current notions of the fundamental limits of governmental
power? To be sure, the big questions-such as how provincial the public
health or how expansive the "general welfare"-are inescapable, and
perhaps the schemata does nothing more than to rush courts headlong
into a consideration of these problems. Perhaps because these questions
are always there and must always be confronted, how one gets
there-by this schemata or otherwise-is irrelevant. Yet surely it is not
superfluous to know when the big question is one of methodology or
is one of goals. And surely it is not irrelevant for courts to concentrate
straightaway on how public the goal, how general the public welfare
or how tolerable the intrusion without a cop-out in favor of health and
safety or legislative discretion. The stakes are high and time is running
out. The ghetto is restless; its victims wish to move out and share in
the good life. The supply of available land is not endless, the chain of
urban development is nearly complete, especially along the Atlantic
coast. Courts must be persuaded to ask the right questions at the right
time in meeting their obligation to safeguard against misguided and
excessive exercise of governmental power.
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